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ABSTRACT 
Professional speech should receive robust First Amendment protection.  It should be shielded 
from state interference that seeks to prescribe or alter the content of professional advice.  But 
how should we decide what advice falls within the scope of defensible professional 
knowledge?  Where, in other words, does First Amendment protection for professional speech 
end and tort liability for professional malpractice begin?  This Article provides a theoretical 
foundation to distinguish professional from unprofessional advice.  
The professions are best conceptualized as knowledge communities whose main reason for 
existence is the generation and dissemination of knowledge.  But knowledge communities are 
not monolithic; there is a range of knowledge that is acceptable as good professional advice.  
Advice falling within this range should receive robust First Amendment protection.  
Conversely, bad advice is subject to professional malpractice liability, and the First 
Amendment provides no defense.  Protecting good professional advice and sanctioning bad 
advice requires a normative and doctrinal defense for excluding outliers from First 
Amendment protection.  In providing such a defense, this Article puts the First Amendment 
into conversation with the tort law of professional malpractice and the law of evidence 
governing the admissibility of expert testimony.  Conceptualizing professionals as members of 
knowledge communities, this Article provides a theory to identify the range of valid 
professional knowledge for First Amendment purposes. 
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When you go to your doctor, lawyer, therapist, or pharmacist, you do so 
because you want to access a useful body of knowledge these professionals 
possess.  In order to solve your individual problem, you rely on the profes-
sional’s competent, accurate, and comprehensive advice.  But what if your 
advice-giving professional departs from, or refuses to deploy, the full range 
of professional knowledge?  Imagine she has a political, philosophical, or 
religious disagreement with her profession: your lawyer objects to same-
sex marriage and refuses to draft marriage-related documents for you and 
your same-sex spouse;1 your therapist believes homosexual behavior is sin-
ful and homosexuality ought to be remedied by conversion therapy;2 your 
 
 1 Cf. Elizabeth Sepper, Doctoring Discrimination in the Same-Sex Marriage Debates, 89 IND. L.J. 
703, 707–08 (2014) (“Lawyers could refuse to prepare prenuptial agreements [for same-sex cou-
ples].”). 
 2 See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1222 (9th Cir. 2014), (upholding the California conversion 
therapy law against a Free Speech challenge); King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 240–41 
(3d Cir. 2014) (upholding the New Jersey conversion therapy law against a Free Speech and Free 
Exercise challenge); Doe v. Christie, 33 F. Supp. 3d 518, 520 (D.N.J. 2014) aff’d sub nom. Doe 
v. Governor of N.J., 783 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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pharmacist considers abortion to be a grave moral wrong, believes some 
forms of birth control to be abortifacients, and refuses to advise on the 
availability of such drugs.3  Or your advice-giving professional has a scien-
tific disagreement with her profession: your doctor thinks marijuana is 
medically beneficial;4 perhaps she finds mammograms useless.5 
Professional speech should receive robust First Amendment protection.  
In particular, it should be shielded from state interference that seeks to pre-
scribe or alter the content of professional advice.6  While new forms of ag-
gressive state intervention into professional advice-giving have made the 
need for such protection particularly salient,7 the federal appellate courts 
are in marked disagreement on the proper treatment of these issues.8  High-
lighting the profound difficulties courts face in analyzing the underlying 
theoretical and doctrinal questions, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit alone 
 
 3 Cf. Stormans v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1071 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding Washington’s re-
quirement that pharmacies dispense all available prescription medications), cert. denied, 136 S. 
Ct. 2433 (2016). 
 4 Cf. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 2002) (physicians treating patients with seri-
ous illnesses recommended medical marijuana despite contrary government policy). 
 5 Cf. Denise Grady, American Cancer Society, in a Shift, Recommends Fewer Mammograms, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 20, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1kmsLFE (reporting on Kevin C. Oeffinger et al., Breast 
Cancer Screening for Women at Average Risk: 2015 Guideline Update From the American Can-
cer Society, 314 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1599 (2015); Evan R. Myers et al., Benefits and Harms of 
Breast Cancer Screening: A Systematic Review, 314 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1615 (2015); Nancy L. 
Keating & Lydia E. Pace, Editorial, New Guidelines for Breast Cancer Screening in US Women, 
314 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1569 (2015)); Gina Kolata, Vast Study Casts Doubts on Value of Mam-
mograms, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1eSbFcm (reporting on Mette Kalager et 
al., Editorial, Too Much Mammography, BRIT. MED. J. (2014) and Anthony Miller et al., Twenty 
Five Year Follow-up for Breast Cancer Incidence and Mortality of the Canadian National Breast 
Screening Study: Randomised Screening Trial, BRIT. MED. J. (2014)). 
 6 See generally Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238 (2016) (developing a 
theory of First Amendment protection for professional speech based on an understanding of the 
professions as knowledge communities). 
 7 See, e.g., Rick Rojas, Arizona Orders Doctors to Say Abortions with Drugs May Be Reversible, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1DpDo0Q (“Arizona . . . became the first state to pass 
a law requiring doctors who perform drug-induced abortions to tell women that the procedure 
may be reversible, an assertion that most doctors say is wrong.”); see also Planned Parenthood 
Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 906 (8th Cir. 2012) (uphold-
ing a state law requiring doctors to inform patients seeking an abortion of an increased risk of su-
icide to obtain informed consent). 
 8 Compare Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding California conversion 
therapy law as permissible regulation of conduct), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 740 
F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014) (denying rehearing en banc) with King v. Christie, 981 F. Supp. 2d 
296, 320 (D.N.J. 2013) (upholding New Jersey conversion therapy law as permissible regulation 
of speech), aff’d, 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 248 (4th 
Cir. 2014) (rejecting the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ interpretation of constitutionality of abortion 
regulations under the First Amendment). 
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issued three consecutive conflicting opinions in the same case9 before the 
court’s en banc decision offered yet another analysis.10 
Existing accounts of professional speech pay insufficient attention to 
theorizing about the scope of defensible professional advice.11  If the First 
Amendment protects good professional advice, how should we decide what 
advice falls within the scope of defensible professional knowledge?  
Where, in other words, does First Amendment protection for professional 
speech end and tort liability for professional malpractice begin?  Answer-
ing these questions requires a firm theoretical foundation to distinguish 
professional from unprofessional advice.  The larger jurisprudential en-
deavor in this Article, then, is to chart the boundaries between the First 
Amendment and tort law. 
This Article provides a theory of the scope of First Amendment protec-
tion for professional advice, and explains and justifies corollaries in other 
areas of law.  The professions, as I have argued before, are best conceptual-
 
 9  Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger I), 760 F.3d 1195, 1203 (11th Cir. 2014) (up-
holding a Florida law prohibiting doctors from inquiring about gun ownership as “a legitimate 
regulation of professional conduct”), vacated and superseded on reh’g (Wollschlaeger II), 797 
F.3d 859, 868-69 (11th Cir. 2015) (upholding the Florida law as “a permissible restriction on 
physician speech”).  The court reached its decision applying “a lesser form of scrutiny” common-
ly applied in commercial speech cases.  Wollschlaeger II at 892-94, vacated and superseded on 
reh’g (Wollschlaeger III), 814 F.3d 1159, 1168 (11th Cir. 2015) (upholding the Florida law as “a 
permissible restriction on physician speech”).  This time, the court held the statute survives strict 
scrutiny (however, it did so without determining what level of scrutiny should apply).  Woll-
schlaeger III at 1186, vacated by granting en banc reh’g, 649 F. App’x 647 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 10  Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger IV), 848 F.3d 1293, 1318 (11th Cir. 2017) 
(holding unconstitutional as violating the First Amendment the record-keeping, inquiry, and anti-
harassment provisions and holding constitutional the anti-discrimination provision of the Florida 
Firearms Owners’ Privacy Act).  
 11 There is renewed academic interest in the topic of professional speech, but the focus of inquiry 
tends to be primarily on the question of its constitutional protection rather than the scope of what 
constitutes good professional advice.  See, e.g., Martha Swartz, Are Physician-Patient Communi-
cations Protected by the First Amendment?, 2015 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 92, 93 (2015); 
Harrison Blythe, Note, Physician-Patient Speech: An Analysis of the State of Patients’ First 
Amendment Rights to Receive Accurate Medical Advice, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795, 798 
(2015); Rodney A. Smolla, Professional Speech and the First Amendment, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 
67 (2016); Patrick Bannon, Note, Intermediate Scrutiny vs. the “Labeling Game” Approach: 
King v. Governor of New Jersey & the Benefits of Applying Heightened Scrutiny to Professional 
Speech, 23 J.L. & POL’Y 649 (2015); Erika Schutzman, Note, We Need Professional Help: Advo-
cating for a Consistent Standard of Review When Regulations of Professional Speech Implicate 
the First Amendment, 56 B.C. L. REV. 2019 (2015); Ryan T. Weiss, Note, Removing the “Silenc-
er”: Coverage & Protection of Physician Speech Under the First Amendment, 65 DUKE L.J. 801 
(2016); Shannon Zabel, Note, Docs v. Glocks: The Need for First Amendment Protection in Pre-
ventative Care, 24 TEMPLE POL. & CIV. RTS L. REV. 483 (2015); Kayla M. Bennett, Comment, 
Professional Speech Targeted by the Florida Gun Privacy Law: The Impact of Wollschlaeger on 
Physician and Attorney Speech, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 725 (2015); Kathryn E. Mayer, Note, Taking 
Physicians Out of the Straightjacket: Defending Physician Free Speech Rights by Defining the 
“Truthful and Nonmisleading” Standard, 104 KY. L.J. 353 (2016). 
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ized as knowledge communities whose main reason for existence is the 
generation and dissemination of knowledge.12  But knowledge communities 
are not monolithic: there is a range of knowledge that is acceptable as good 
professional advice.  Advice falling within this range should receive robust 
First Amendment protection.  Conversely, bad advice—that is, advice fall-
ing outside of the acceptable range—is subject to professional malpractice 
liability, and the First Amendment provides no defense.13  Conceptualizing 
the professions as knowledge communities provides a theoretical basis for 
this doctrinal truism. 
Protecting good professional advice and sanctioning bad advice—or, in-
terchangeably, “unprofessional advice”—requires a normative and doctri-
nal defense for excluding outliers from First Amendment protection when 
their professional advice diverges too much from the profession’s consen-
sus.14  But how much is too much—and who decides?  As a matter of free 
speech theory, excluding outliers runs headlong into an otherwise axiomat-
ic First Amendment principle: the prohibition of content discrimination.15  
Robert Post has identified a tension between expert knowledge and the un-
 
 12 Haupt, supra note 6, at 1241. 
 13 It is well established in the literature that the First Amendment provides no defense against mal-
practice claims.  See Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of 
Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 950–51 (2007) (“Without so much as a 
nod to the First Amendment, doctors are routinely held liable for malpractice for speaking or fail-
ing to speak . . . . First Amendment values would seem to carry very little force in the context of 
professional speech.”); cf. Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Ille-
gal Courses of Conduct, “Situation Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1344, 1347 (2005) (noting some speech may be inherently harmful and 
thus ripe for regulation).  Nonetheless, some courts continue to struggle with this.  Stated in an 
oversimplified way, the argument is that the state may regulate the professions and the permissi-
bility of regulation is incompatible with the First Amendment.  See, e.g., King v. Christie, 981 F. 
Supp. 2d 296, 319 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]here is a more fundamental problem with [the argument 
that professional counseling is speech], because taken to its logical end, it would mean that any 
regulation of professional counseling necessarily implicates fundamental First Amendment free 
speech rights, and therefore would need to withstand heightened scrutiny to be permissible.  Such 
a result runs counter to the longstanding principle that a state generally may enact laws rationally 
regulating professionals, including those providing medicine and mental health services.”) (em-
phasis in original). 
 14 I use the term “consensus” not in the sense of “truth,” but rather agreement relative to the rele-
vant knowledge community.  See, e.g., Sheila Jasanoff, Serviceable Truths: Science for Action in 
Law and Policy, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1723, 1741 (2015) (“[T]he argument is not that science has 
been able to access unvarnished truth, but rather that relevant scientific communities have been 
able to set aside all theoretical and methodological disagreements to come together on a shared 
position.  If most or all members of the relevant thought collective are in agreement, then that 
collective judgment surely demands a high degree of respect from society in general and the law 
more particularly.”). 
 15   But see Wollschlaeger IV, 848 F.3d 1293 (applying content neutrality to professional speech).  I 
would reject the application of the content-neutrality requirement in the area of professional 
speech, see Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech and the Content-Neutrality Trap, 127 YALE 
L.J. F. __ (forthcoming 2017) draft available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2945062. 
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derlying assumptions of First Amendment doctrine, concluding that 
“[e]xpert knowledge requires exactly what normal First Amendment doc-
trine prohibits.”16  Reconsidering the role of experts—in this case, profes-
sionals—and their relationship with knowledge communities, however, 
provides a new perspective.  Viewed from this vantage point, this Article 
argues, First Amendment interests can be reconciled with the “truth”-
seeking, preserving, and communicating nature of professional speech.  
Conceptualizing professionals as members of knowledge communities 
guides the task of identifying the range of valid professional knowledge for 
First Amendment purposes. 
This Article distinguishes between two kinds of professionals who de-
part from the consensus of their knowledge community: internal outliers 
and external outliers.  I define as internal outliers professionals within 
knowledge communities whose disagreement results from alternative as-
sessments based on the profession’s shared ways of knowing and reason-
ing, that is, alternative assessments based on a shared methodology.  These 
professionals are part of the knowledge community.  By contrast, I define 
as external outliers those professionals who premise their disagreement on 
refusing to follow the shared ways of knowing and reasoning due to exoge-
nous beliefs.  These professionals place themselves outside the knowledge 
community. 
I suggest that to the extent that a professional’s internal outlier status is 
based upon disagreement with the knowledge community’s insights based 
on shared notions of validity, departure from the professional standard 
ought to be permissible.  Indeed, dynamic development and refinement of 
professional insights will often depend on such divergent assessments.17  
Internal outliers, however, can also produce bad advice by misusing the 
agreed-upon methodologies and bases for reasoning within the discourse of 
the profession.18  Yet, even these professionals ostensibly base their find-
ings on the same knowledge foundation.  Conversely, external outliers’ re-
liance on exogenous reasons undermines the status of the professional as a 
member of the knowledge community.  An external outlier by definition 
does not place her professional advice on shared notions of validity and 
common ways of knowing and reasoning.19 
This analysis plays out against a larger jurisprudential (and political) 
backdrop.  The role of external outliers is connected to questions surround-
ing individual exemptions from generally applicable laws.  In the wake of 
 
 16 ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 9 (2012). 
 17 Infra Part IV.B. 
 18 Infra Part IV.A. 
 19 Infra Part II.A. 
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Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.20 and the recent spate of state religious 
freedom legislation—first in anticipation of, and then in reaction to, mar-
riage equality nationwide21—these  issues have come to the forefront of le-
gal and political debate.22  Though the focus in this area tends to be on 
commercial services,23 the provision of professional services may be even 
more fraught.24  Internal outliers, likewise, may find themselves in the mi-
nority due to shifting understandings of the underlying knowledge basis.  
What once was accepted in the field may soon be outdated.  Scientific, le-
 
 20 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 21 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (recognizing a constitutional right of 
same-sex marriage). 
 22 See generally Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Con-
science Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516 (2015) (discussing, in light of Hob-
by Lobby, claims of religious exemptions from generally applicable laws).  It is entirely possible 
that the Hobby Lobby decision will have more political than legal force going forward.  See, e.g., 
Ira C. Lupu, Moving Targets: Religious Freedom, Hobby Lobby, & the Future of LGBT Rights, 7 
ALABAMA CIV. RTS & CIV. LIB. L. REV. 1 (2015) (“[T]he political impact of Hobby Lobby may 
be much greater than its legal impact.”).  Either way, the decision and its aftermath inform the 
background of this discussion.  See also Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016) 
(Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“This case is an ominous sign.  At issue are 
Washington State regulations that are likely to make a pharmacist unemployable if he or she ob-
jects on religious grounds to dispensing certain prescription medications . . . . If this is a sign of 
how religious liberty claims will be treated in the years ahead, those who value religious freedom 
have cause for great concern.”). 
 23 One of the paradigmatic cases in this area is Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 
62–63, 72 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014) (upholding the New Mexico Human 
Rights Act against free speech and free exercise challenges and finding a company refusing to 
photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony violated the Act by discriminating on the basis of 
sexual orientation).  See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public 
Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1233–37 (2014) (“Although the New Mexico Su-
preme Court rejected Elane Photography’s First Amendment free speech claim, that claim de-
serves close analysis, for businesses subject to public accommodations laws will surely raise sim-
ilar arguments in the future.”); see also Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 187 Wash.2d 804, 
823 (Wash. 2017)  (holding a flower shop owner liable under a Washington anti-discrimination 
law for refusing to sell flowers to same-sex couple and finding the law does not violate the First 
Amendment); Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 283 (Colo. App. 2015) (hold-
ing that a bakery “violated Colorado's public accommodations law by refusing to create a wed-
ding cake for Craig's and Mullins' same-sex wedding celebration”), petition for cert. filed, No. 
16-111 (U.S. Jul. 22, 2016); Lupu, supra note 22, at 33–35 (providing an overview of current lit-
igation in this area). 
 24 See, e.g., Abby Phillip, Pediatrician Refuses to Treat Baby with Lesbian Parents and There’s 
Nothing Illegal About It, WASH. POST, (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/morning-mix/wp/2015/02/19/pediatrician-refuses-to-treat-baby-with-lesbian-parents-and-
theres-nothing-illegal-about-it/ (“A Michigan pediatrician declined to treat the infant daughter of 
a lesbian couple in yet another example of the growing tensions between advocates for LGBT 
rights and those who want greater religious expression protections.”); Emma Green, When Doc-
tors Refuse to Treat LGBT Patients, THE ATLANTIC, (Apr. 19, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com 
  /health/archive/2016/04/medical-religious-exemptions-doctors-therapists-mississippi-tennessee/ 
  478797/ (discussing Mississippi law extending conscience objections to treating LGBT patients). 
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gal, and political forces may interact in a way that sometimes aligns with 
the insights of the knowledge community, but sometimes contradicts them. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts.  Part I introduces the concept of 
knowledge communities, and focuses the analysis on knowledge communi-
ties as providers of professional services.  It considers how knowledge is 
formed within these communities, public expectations toward these com-
munities, and state regulation of them.  Complicating the picture, it takes 
into account different institutional settings in which professionals operate. 
Part II takes a normative view of professionals’ duties and justifications 
for departure from professional consensus.  This Part assesses the role of 
outliers within and outside of professional knowledge communities and the 
fundamental expectations of the public served by these professionals.  It 
investigates what constitutes an appropriate basis for justifying a profes-
sional’s outlier status.  The point of departure is the concept of the profes-
sions as knowledge communities, and especially the notion of a shared 
knowledge basis.  For all valid claims, I argue, reference to the shared 
knowledge basis and common ways of knowing and reasoning is necessary.  
Scientific disagreement within the knowledge community must be based on 
individual professionals’ divergent interpretations of the shared knowledge.  
The advice-giving function of the individual professional is thus tied back 
to the range of defensible opinions within the knowledge community.  If, 
however, the advice is based on an assessment of the knowledge rooted in 
exogenous reasons, the professional places himself outside of the 
knowledge community.  Here, the distinction between internal and external 
outliers is key.  Both internal and external outliers can produce unprofes-
sional advice.  But the difference is that internal outliers will base their rea-
soning on shared knowledge while external outliers will base theirs on ex-
ogenous factors.  The law should protect the exogenous beliefs of external 
outliers as a matter of personal belief of the individual.  But it should not, 
as a general matter, accommodate them as justifying departure from profes-
sional knowledge. 
Part III turns to the treatment of outliers in tort law on professional 
malpractice and the law of evidence governing the admissibility of expert 
testimony, bringing these areas of law into conversation with the First 
Amendment.  The treatment of outliers in these areas provides the norma-
tive corollary of basing good professional advice on a shared methodology 
and shared ways of knowing and reasoning.  The distinction between good 
and bad advice should be drawn along these lines.  It thus supports the divi-
sion of professionals into internal and external outliers.  Whether the sub-
stantive content of advice internal outliers give—advice that is based on a 
shared methodology and common ways of knowing and reasoning—clears 
the bar of good advice, moreover, is also for the knowledge community to 
decide.  Both tort law and evidence already operate on this basis; and both 
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have resolved the overarching “who decides” questions largely in favor of 
the knowledge community.  Thus, in addition to providing normative sup-
port, these areas inform the workability of this approach in litigation prac-
tice. 
Part IV demonstrates how this theory of the scope of First Amendment 
protection for professional advice works when applied to the controversies 
referenced at the outset.  These examples illustrate problems associated 
with identifying the range of valid professional advice.  Applying the theo-
ry of distinguishing professional from unprofessional advice proposed in 
this Article provides guidance in resolving these disputes. 
I.  THE PROFESSIONS AS KNOWLEDGE COMMUNITIES 
The learned professions are best conceptualized as knowledge commu-
nities.25  Taking this view as the starting point has significant implications 
for the role of the individual professional, both in relation to her client and 
in relation to her profession.  The state regulates the professions in multiple 
and varied ways, including through licensing requirements and the imposi-
tion of professional malpractice liability.  When state regulation aligns with 
professional insights, it is usually unproblematic.  But when state regula-
tion is incompatible with professional insights, significant problems arise. 
State involvement in determining training requirements to obtain pro-
fessional licensing in particular can lead to considerable tensions.  In li-
censing, the administrative function of granting access to the profession 
and the substantive evaluation of the knowledge community’s ability to 
impart its professional knowledge come together.  It is appropriate for the 
state to enforce formal educational standards without implicating profes-
sional speech.26  But the substantive content of the educational programs 
directly affects the content of professional advice.  State involvement, ac-
cordingly, should be tailored with deference to the knowledge community. 
A.  Professionals as Members of Knowledge Communities 
The definition of “profession” and the processes of professionalization 
are contested.  But the key defining feature—and one generally shared 
across the manifold definitions—is the professions’ knowledge-based char-
acter.27  Thus, “[t]he connection to a knowledge community circumscribes 
 
 25 Haupt, supra note 6, at 1241; see also Timothy Zick, Professional Rights Speech, 47 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 1289, 1294 (2015) (adopting the characterization of the professions as “knowledge commu-
nities”). 
 26 Haupt, supra note 6, at 1282–83. 
 27 Id. at 1249. 
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the type of communication rendered as professional advice.”28  The central-
ity of knowledge is reflected in the asymmetrical relationship between the 
professional and the client.  The very reason the professional’s advice is 
valuable to the client is that the professional has knowledge that the client 
lacks.  In order to make important life decisions, the client depends on ac-
cessing the knowledge community’s knowledge through the individual pro-
fessional. 
[K]nowledge communities . . . describe a network of individuals who share 
common knowledge and experience as a result of training and practice.  They 
are engaged in solving similar problems by drawing on a shared reservoir of 
knowledge which, at the same time, they help define and to which they con-
tribute.  Their common understandings allow for the generation and exchange 
of insights within the [knowledge] community.  Consequently, members of 
knowledge communities have shared notions of validity and a common way of 
knowing and reasoning.29 
Despite possible disagreement on individual issues, professionals continue 
to subscribe to a shared body of knowledge.30  Yet, it is important to em-
phasize that “this is not to say that knowledge communities are monolithic.  
But their shared notions of validity limit the range of acceptable opinions 
found within them.”31  It is the challenge of defining this range of valid 
professional opinions that the remainder of this Article addresses. 
1.  Individual Professionals 
Professional speech is speech by a professional, within a professional-
client relationship, communicating the insights of the knowledge communi-
ty for the purpose of providing professional advice.32  Conceptualizing the 
individual professional in this manner as the conduit between the 
knowledge community and the client requires distinguishing the profes-
sional’s personal opinion from his professional advice.  It is worth reiterat-
ing that distinction.33  The key to determining what is professional advice is 
whether the advice is rendered within the confines of a professional-client 
relationship: “Where the personal nexus between professional and client 
does not exist, and a speaker does not purport to be exercising judgment on 
behalf of any particular individual with whose circumstances he is directly 
acquainted”34 the speaker is not engaged in professional speech.  Thus, 
 
 28 Id. at 1248. 
 29 Id. at 1250–51. 
 30 Id. at 1250. 
 31 Id. at 1251. 
 32 Id. at 1247. 
 33 See id. at 1254–57 (providing a more detailed discussion of distinguishing private speech). 
 34 Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring). 
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speech by a professional35 outside of the professional-client relationship is 
not professional speech.36 
Speaking as a participant in public discourse, a professional’s private 
speech receives ordinary First Amendment protection.  It is likely that the 
speaker’s professional training will influence the listeners’ perception of 
the message, in particular its accuracy.37  But as long as the speaker is not 
acting within the confines of the professional-client relationship, it is im-
portant to recognize that he is not bound by the knowledge community’s 
insights.  Indeed, speaking in public discourse, the speaker is free to chal-
lenge even the most axiomatic insights of the knowledge community.38 
Consider a professional—a trained physician, for instance—hosting a 
television program in which he dispenses advice.39  Even if the physician 
disagrees with the profession, he cannot under the First Amendment be 
held to the standard of medical malpractice that would censor him within 
the professional-client relationship.40  In short, a professional may give bad 
advice to millions of viewers—but not to one client.  At the intersection of 
professional speech and academic speech, the protection of private speech 
in public discourse plays out in the same way.  Imagine the physician on 
television also holds a medical faculty appointment, and the insights propa-
gated to viewers do not hold up to scientific standards.41  Here, too, the 
 
 35 See Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status 
of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 843 (1999) (explaining that enforcement of profes-
sional norms extends to speech used in the course of professional practice, not simply speech ut-
tered by a professional); Post, supra note 13, at 947 (quoting id.). 
 36 See Halberstam, supra note 35, at 851 (“Publication of advice for indiscriminate distribution 
generally will defeat a conclusion that the advice was rendered within the professional-client re-
lationship . . . .”); see also Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1054 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Thus, outside 
the doctor-patient relationship, doctors are constitutionally equivalent to soapbox orators and 
pamphleteers, and their speech receives robust protection under the First Amendment.”). 
 37 Haupt, supra note 6, at 1255–56. 
 38 See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 35, at 848 (noting that the First Amendment protects the prac-
tice of the profession, not the listener’s subjective desire for information); see also Post, supra 
note 13, at 947 (discussing the disciplining of doctors and dentists who told patients that amal-
gams were toxic despite the weight of scientific evidence suggesting otherwise); POST, supra 
note 16, at 12–13 (recounting the controversy over the safety of dental amalgams). 
 39 For a recent highly publicized controversy that played out along these lines, see, e.g., Bill 
Gifford, Dr. Oz is No Wizard, but No Quack, Either, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 26, 2015, at SR 3 (recap-
ping the controversy surrounding Dr. Oz’s program). 
 40 Post, supra note 13, at 949 (“When a physician speaks to the public, his opinions cannot be cen-
sored and suppressed, even if they are at odds with preponderant opinion within the medical es-
tablishment.”); POST, supra note 16, at 43 (“If an expert chooses to participate in public dis-
course by speaking about matters within her expertise, her speech will characteristically be 
classified as fully protected opinion.”). 
 41 See, e.g., Verena Dobnik, Physicians Want Dr. Oz Gone from Columbia Medical Faculty, WASH. 
TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/16/doctors-want-
mehmet-oz-gone-from-columbia-faculty/ (discussing the demand made by a group of doctors to 
remove Dr. Oz from the Columbia faculty due to his televised promotion of treatments and cures 
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First Amendment provides protection of private speech in public discourse 
where academic standards are not fulfilled.  As Robert Post puts it: 
Biologists can with impunity write editorials in the New York Times that are 
such poor science that they would constitute grounds for denying tenure within 
a university.  Members of the general public can rely on expert pronounce-
ments within public discourse only at their peril.  Such pronouncements are ul-
timately subject to political rather than legal accountability.42 
The underlying justification is that the First Amendment should treat 
speakers in public discourse as equals.  Consequently, there is no such 
thing as the notion of a “false idea” in public discourse.43  By contrast, 
while there is a range of valid professional opinions that members of the 
knowledge community may disagree on, there is also a universe of advice 
that is plainly wrong as a matter of expert knowledge.  What constitutes 
valid professional knowledge, however, is for the profession to decide.  
Expert knowledge thus is not treated as equal to other opinions.  And we 
affirmatively do not want it to be: this notion is clearly reflected in the im-
position of tort liability for professional malpractice.  The tort regime di-
rectly, and appropriately, sanctions unprofessional advice. 
A critic of distinguishing the role of the professional in public discourse 
might object that the very notion of “public discourse” is indeterminate. 
But whatever the controversies at the margins concerning the concept of 
public discourse might be, the professional-client relationship is not part of 
it.  The law already attaches certain distinct features to this particular rela-
tionship between speaker and listener, including evidentiary privileges, a 
fiduciary duty and a duty of confidentiality.  In doing so, it singles out the 
professional-client relationship as distinct. 
2.  Institutional Settings 
Many professionals are not solo-practitioners, but rather work within 
various institutional settings; this complicates the picture significantly.  
Their obligations to their profession may clash with their obligations to 
their institutional employer.  The entities in which professionals are em-
bedded can be governmental or private, religious or secular.  Depending on 
 
that are allegedly unsupported by scientific evidence); Terrence McCoy, Half of Dr. Oz’s Medi-
cal Advice is Baseless or Wrong, Study Says, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/12/19/half-of-dr-ozs-medical-
advice-is-baseless-or-wrong-study-says/?utm_term=.a72528168ae0 (illustrating the debate sur-
rounding Dr. Oz’s promotion of treatments that have been unsupported or contradicted by scien-
tific studies). 
 42 POST, supra note 16, at 44. 
 43 Post, supra note 13, at 949 (internal citations omitted); see United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 
2537 (2012) (explaining how false ideas are not categorically unprotected by the First Amend-
ment). 
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these variables, professionals will be pulled in different directions regard-
ing the content of their advice.  But the First Amendment should protect 
professionals who resist those forces to guard their professional advice 
against outside interference.  Professionals’ primary allegiance ought to be 
to their knowledge community on the one hand, and their clients on the 
other.  If professionals are hired to provide professional services, the con-
tent of their advice should not be determined by who pays them, but rather, 
by the knowledge community’s understanding of what constitutes defensi-
ble professional advice.  This is also the underlying assumption of the tort 
regime.44 
With respect to governmental settings, the Supreme Court addressed 
government-funded professional services perhaps most prominently in Rust 
v. Sullivan,45 concerning abortion counseling, and Legal Services Corpora-
tion v. Velazquez,46 concerning legal advice.  While the Court held the lim-
its on abortion counseling in Rust to be compatible with the First Amend-
ment, it held unconstitutional the restrictions imposed on legal advice in 
Velazquez.47 
In Rust, recipients of federal funding for “family-planning services” 
were prohibited from disseminating advice on abortion.48  Moreover, pro-
viders were barred from “referral for abortion as a method of family plan-
ning.”49  These limits on professional advice applied “even upon specific 
request.”50  However, providers were given a “permissible response to such 
an inquiry”: “[T]he project does not consider abortion an appropriate meth-
od of family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer for abor-
tion.”51  The Court upheld the funding scheme against the First Amendment 
challenge, pointing out that the professionals “remain free to say whatever 
they wish about abortion outside the [government-funded] project.”52  By 
framing the case as one about selectively funding some activities but not 
others, Chief Justice William Rehnquist obscured the point that profession-
al speech was at the heart of the matter.53  The opinion expressly left unan-
swered the question about First Amendment protection of government-
 
 44 Infra Part III.A. 
 45 500 U.S. 173, 178 (1991). 
 46 531 U.S. 533, 536–37 (2001). 
 47 See also Haupt, supra note 6, at 1259–62 (discussing the relevance of these cases for profession-
al speech doctrine). 
 48 Rust, 500 U.S. at 178–79. 
 49 Id. at 179 (internal quotations omitted). 
 50 Id. at 180. 
 51 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 52 Id. at 183 (internal quotations omitted). 
 53 See id. at 193 (asserting that the government “has merely chosen to fund one activity to the ex-
clusion of another.”). 
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funded professional speech.54  Under the knowledge community-focused 
theory of professional speech, however, this question will likely be an-
swered as follows: if a professional is paid to give professional advice, the 
professional’s primary allegiance is to the knowledge community and the 
client.  The First Amendment, therefore, should shield against government 
interference even when the government funds the professional’s advice.  
Indeed, this is the result—even if not the reasoning—the Court reached in 
Velazquez. 
In Velazquez, government-funded Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”) 
attorneys were prohibited from challenging existing welfare law on behalf 
of their indigent clients.55  Justice Anthony Kennedy distinguished Rust as 
a government speech case; by contrast, he asserted that the speech in Ve-
lazquez is private speech.56  This distinction introduces slippage in the con-
cepts of government, private, and professional speech.  As discussed in the 
previous section, professional speech is distinct from private speech of a 
professional.57  Despite this analytical ambiguity, Justice Kennedy focused 
on the professional role of the lawyer, concluding that “[t]he advice from 
the attorney to the client and the advocacy by the attorney to the courts 
cannot be classified as governmental speech even under a generous under-
standing of the concept.  In this vital respect this suit is distinguishable 
from Rust.”58  The government-funded lawyer, in other words, has to fulfill 
the same professional role as any lawyer who is not funded by the govern-
ment, including “complete analysis of the case, full advice to the client, and 
proper presentation to the court.”59 
In terms of the institutional context, it is difficult to distinguish Rust and 
Velazquez, as Justice Antonin Scalia suggested in his Velazquez dissent.60  
The government funds these professional services precisely because they 
are rendered by professionals.  As Justice Harry Blackmun pointed out in 
his Rust dissent, the physicians who are part of the federally funded pro-
gram are expected to give clients comprehensive advice regarding family 
planning.  The project “[seeks] to provide them with the full range of in-
 
 54 Id. at 200 (“It could be argued by analogy that traditional relationships such as that between doc-
tor and patient should enjoy protection under the First Amendment from Government regulation, 
even when subsidized by the Government. We need not resolve that question here . . . .”). 
 55 Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 536–37 (2001). 
 56 Id. at 540–42 (stating that “the LSC program was designed to facilitate private speech, not to 
promote a governmental message.”). 
 57 See supra Part I.A.1. 
 58 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542–43. 
 59 Id. at 546. 
 60 Id. at 553–59 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority’s contention that the subsidized speech in 
these cases is not government speech because the lawyers have a professional obligation to rep-
resent the interests of their clients founders on the reality that the doctors in Rust had a profes-
sional obligation to serve the interests of their patients.”). 
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formation and options regarding their health and reproductive freedom.”61  
In other words, the government-funded professionals in this case, too, are 
expected to act like professionals.  And, as Justice Blackmun emphasized, 
“the legitimate expectations of the patient and the ethical responsibilities of 
the medical profession demand no less.”62  The government funded, as Jus-
tice Scalia put it, “the normal work of doctors” and “the normal work of 
lawyers” in these cases.63 
Of course, the outcome under the knowledge community-focused theo-
ry of professional speech is exactly the opposite from that of the Scalia dis-
sent in Velazquez: both the doctors in Rust and the lawyers in Velazquez 
ought to be able to invoke First Amendment protection of their professional 
speech against outside interference if the government funds them to act as 
“normal” professionals. 
When professionals are directly employed by the government, they are 
likewise held to the standards of the profession.  Government entities can 
also contract with private parties for the provision of professional services 
to government employees.  In one set of cases, professionals were contract-
ed by the government to provide counseling services to government em-
ployees.64  A company providing counseling services to several police de-
partments, including in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Springfield, Illinois, 
for example, sued the respective municipalities over ending the psycholog-
ical counseling contract due to anti-gay views expressed by the profession-
als.65  When their views are expressed outside the professional-client rela-
tionship, they are private speech.  Within this relationship, they are 
professional speech.  And if they are contrary to the professional consen-
sus, they are unprofessional advice. 
Religious organizations have built a large professional services infra-
structure in which professionals are embedded.  The religious tenets, trans-
ferred onto the institutions employing these professionals, may contradict 
their employees’ professional insights.  Elizabeth Sepper has carefully ex-
amined such countervailing forces in the health care context where hospital 
policies may prohibit doctors from employing the full range of their profes-
 
 61 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 213 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 62 Id. at 213–14. 
 63 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 562 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 64 See, e.g., Campion, Barrow & Assocs. of Ill., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 652 F. Supp. 2d 986 
(D. Minn. 2009) (concerning providers of psychological services to police department); Campi-
on, Barrow & Assocs., Inc. v. City of Springfield, 559 F.3d 765 (2009) (concerning the same); 
Walden v. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 669 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2012) (concern-
ing health and wellness services for CDC employees). 
65  Campion, Barrow & Assocs. of Ill., 652 F. Supp. 2d at 990–91; Campion, Barrow & Assocs., 
Inc., 559 F.3d at 767. 
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sional knowledge.66  As the largest nonprofit provider, Catholic healthcare 
is perhaps the most prominent example.67  The United States Conference of 
Catholic Bishops issues the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic 
Health Care Services.68  Several provisions contained in the Directives 
“contradict accepted professional ethical imperatives that require doctors 
and nurses to place patient welfare above self-interest, respect patient au-
tonomy, guarantee continuity of care, and ensure patients receive adequate 
information.”69  Most important for purposes of this discussion is the fact 
that “[t]he directives limit the information doctors may provide to ‘morally 
legitimate alternatives,’ with wide-ranging repercussions for physician 
practice and patient care.”70  To name only one such limit, “Catholic clinics 
have refused to instruct HIV-positive patients as to the importance of con-
doms.”71  The range of advice that may be rendered in these settings is 
markedly limited as compared to the full range of available professional 
knowledge. 
In the healthcare context, however, it is worth noting that “many 
healthcare institutions that assert an objection to legal, medically necessary 
care are not affiliated with any religion.”72  Moreover, the problem is com-
pounded by mergers in the healthcare market.  On the one hand, non-
Catholic hospitals may merge with Catholic healthcare providers.  On the 
other hand, formerly Catholic hospitals may be required to adhere to the 
Directives even after they have been acquired by another entity.73  Sepper 
calls the result “Zombie religious institutions.”74  The continued adherence 
 
 66 See Elizabeth Sepper, Taking Conscience Seriously, 98 VA. L. REV. 1501 (2012). 
 67 Id. at 1519–20. 
 68 U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care 
Services (Nov. 17, 2009), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/health-
care/upload/Ethical-Religious-Directives-Catholic-Health-Care-Services-fifth-edition-2009.pdf. 
 69 Sepper, supra note 66, at 1520. 
 70 Id. at 1521. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 1518.  As Sepper explains: 
Only when an institution refuses to deliver legal, necessary care does the law recognize a 
concept of “institutional conscience.”  Under most provisions, an entire hospital, 
healthcare system, clinic, or practice group may refuse contested treatments.  The legisla-
tion typically does not differentiate between religious and secular, public and private, and 
for-profit and not-for-profit institutions.  In several jurisdictions, broad conscience claus-
es allow any corporation or entity associated with healthcare—including insurance com-
panies—to decline to participate in, refer for, or give information about any healthcare 
service for reasons of conscience.  Employees and medical staff of all faiths, beliefs, and 
backgrounds must then abide by the institutional policy of refusal. 
   Id. at 1514. 
 73 Id. at 1523–24; see also Elizabeth Sepper, Contracting Religion, in LAW, RELIGION, AND 
HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES (Holly Fernandez Lynch, I. Glenn Cohen & Elizabeth Sepper 
eds., forthcoming 2017), draft available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2783518. 
 74  See Elizabeth Sepper, Zombie Religious Institutions, 112 NW. U. L. REV._ (forthcoming 2018) 
draft available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2932235. 
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to the directives by formerly Catholic hospitals that are not readily identifi-
able as such calls into question one possible remedy, namely disclosure.75  
Consequently, as Sepper notes, “providers will be caught between moral 
restrictions and medical ethics.”76  Professionals whose professional obliga-
tion is to render comprehensive advice will find themselves constrained 
from communicating the insights of the knowledge community. 
*** 
The bottom line is this: professionals may operate in a variety of institu-
tional settings.  But if professionals are hired primarily to render profes-
sional advice, no matter the institutional setting, they are members of the 
profession first.  As such, they are bound together by the knowledge com-
munity and its shared ways of knowing and reasoning, serving as the con-
duit between the knowledge community and the client.  Irrespective of the 
institutional setting, the First Amendment should therefore protect defensi-
ble professional advice. 
B. Knowledge Communities, Outliers, and the State 
If shared knowledge is the defining feature, shared education is one of 
the fundamental aspects that bind the members of knowledge communities 
together.  In this context, significant tensions can arise among knowledge 
communities, outliers, and the state.  Consider an example: recently, the 
North Carolina state legislature considered a bill that would have put at risk 
the accreditation of the University of North Carolina (“UNC”) medical 
school.77  The measure “would prevent employees at the state’s two public 
medical schools—UNC and East Carolina University’s Brody School of 
Medicine—from performing or supervising abortion procedures.”78  How-
ever, “[t]he national accrediting body for medical schools requires 
OB/GYN residents to be educated in performing abortion procedures.”79  
State regulation in this instance would have altered the content of what the 
knowledge community has determined to be necessary professional 
knowledge. 
Another illustrative example involves the conflict between the Ameri-
can Psychological Association’s (“APA”) Committee on Accreditation and 
the Department of Education over accreditation standards for psychology 
 
 75 See infra Part II.A.3. 
 76 Sepper, supra note 66, at 1525. 
 77 Sarah Brown, Abortion Bill Targets UNC School of Medicine, THE DAILY TAR HEEL (Apr. 2, 
2015), http://www.dailytarheel.com/article/2015/04/abortion-bill-targets-unc-medical-school. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
688 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 19:3 
 
programs.  The APA delisted homosexuality as a mental disorder in 1973.80  
The APA Ethics Code prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orien-
tation.81  Yet, the accreditation standards in Footnote 4 permitted preferen-
tial hiring and enrollment of coreligionists in psychology programs.82  This 
was seen as undermining the professional norms of psychologists, and the 
APA was poised to remove the footnote.  But in the end, there were con-
cerns over the APA’s status as licensing body.83  The Department of Edu-
cation, in a letter dated September 6, 2001, urged the APA to retain Foot-
note 4.84 
The affair reveals the confluence of substantive concerns over the integ-
rity of the professional knowledge communicated in the programs, and sub-
sequently by professionals who graduate from them, and the seemingly 
merely administrative question of which programs’ graduates are eligible to 
be licensed psychologists.  Voices in the psychology literature have articu-
lated this concern as follows: “The ethical codes of the helping professions, 
which are fundamental to the profession and the education and training of 
professionals, have been set against the U.S. Constitution and the personal 
freedoms it protects (i.e., freedom of religion and freedom of speech).”85  
Persuading (or pressuring, as some suggest86) the profession to maintain an 
exemption for religious programs thus amounts to state interference endors-
ing the outlier status of certain professionals against the rest of the profes-
sion.  The state thus enforces a substantive change in the knowledge com-
 
 80 Maryka Biaggio, Sue Orchard, Jane Larson, Kelly Petrino, & Roberta Mihara, Guidelines for 
Gay/Lesbian/Bixesual-Affirmative Educational Practices in Graduate Psychology Programs, 34 
PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 548 (2003). 
 81 Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, 
http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/ (last updated Jan. 1, 2017). 
 82 For a brief history of Footnote 4, see Clark D. Campbell, Religion in Education and Training, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 472, 
478 (W. Brad Johnson & Nadine J. Kaslow eds., 2014). 
 83 See D. Smith, Accreditation Committee Decides to Keep Religious Exemption, 33 MONITOR ON 
PSYCHOLOGY 16 (2002). 
Also affecting the committee’s decision was the U.S. Department of Education (DOE), 
which suggested that, if the footnote was removed, it would be forced to consider revok-
ing APA’s recognition as an accrediting body.  Since APA is the only organization ap-
proved by the DOE to accredit professional psychology programs, that would have left all 
psychology students in a lurch—ineligible for some types of federal funding and, in some 
cases, unable to gain licensure. 
  Id. 
 84 Letter from William D. Hansen to Susan Zlotlow, Director, Off. of Program Consultation and 
Accreditation, American Psychological Ass’n, https://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/guid/ 
  secletter/010906.html. 
 85 Kristin A. Hancock, Student Beliefs, Multiculturalism, and Client Welfare, 1 PSYCHOLOGY OF 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER DIVERSITY 4 (2014). 
 86 Maryka Biaggio, Do Some APA-Accredited Programs Undermine Training to Serve Clients of 
Diverse Sexual Orientation?, 1 PSYCHOLOGY OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER 
DIVERSITY 93, 94 (2014) (speaking of “significant external pressure”). 
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munity’s shared training, demanding the permissibility of certain outlier 
positions against the knowledge community itself. 
Accommodating student claims for exemption from certain training re-
quirements against their educational institutions has the same effect.87  Fu-
ture professionals may be trained in secular or religious schools, and the 
formation of the knowledge basis of each individual professional is influ-
enced accordingly.  Upon endorsing the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion’s elimination of homosexuality from its list of mental disorders, the 
APA set as a goal of psychology training “that psychologists work to re-
move the stigma that had been attached to homosexuality.”88  The internal 
discourse of the profession concerning accreditation of psychology pro-
grams focused on access of LGBT students to psychology programs as well 
as the substantive training all psychology students receive on LGBT is-
sues.89 
The particular challenges of religious professional education are well 
recognized in the psychology literature: “As may be expected, any time 
minority programs deviate from accepted paradigms for professional prepa-
rations, there are issues with which to reckon.”90  According to estimates, 
there are less than a dozen APA-accredited Christian psychology pro-
grams.91  One comparative study of evangelical protestant psychologists 
trained in secular and those trained in religiously affiliated programs—
counterintuitively—found that “[r]eligious psychologists trained at secular 
programs were comparatively more conservative and more likely to use 
and value religious techniques in psychotherapy with religious or nonreli-
gious clients than were religious psychologists trained at religiously affili-
 
 87 See, e.g., Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 2011) (expelling a student for 
hypothetical statements that she would reference LBGTQ clients to conversion therapy was not a 
violation of student’s first amendment rights); Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(holding that expelling a student for referral of an LGBTQ client to other students against 
school’s policy was a violation of First Amendment rights).  In the psychology literature it has 
been emphasized that the programs in these cases are not APA-accredited psychology programs.  
See Campbell, supra note 78, at 484 (“There have been several stories over the last few years 
about trainees who have refused to work with a gay student or trainees who insisted upon using 
reparative therapies . . . . However, in reviewing these cases, the students are usually not psy-
chology graduate students from APA-accredited programs.”).  While this is certainly relevant for 
the internal discourse within the psychology profession, it does not affect the larger point: the 
state is endorsing students’ outlier status against the consensus of the profession regarding ap-
propriate education standards. 
 88 Biaggio et al., supra note 80, at 548. 
 89 Id. at 549. 
 90 Campbell, supra note 82, at 481 (“Specifically, religious distinctive programs have to repeatedly 
address issues of academic freedom and diversity, particularly as they relate to sexual orientation 
and the provisions of Footnote 4 in the G&P . . . .”). 
 91 Id. at 478 (pointing out further that to date, “all religious distinctive programs are founded on the 
Christian faith tradition.”). 
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ated programs.”92  In response, some suggest that “training provided in re-
ligious distinctive programs prepares students for more judicious use of 
such interventions.”93  Voices in the psychology literature lament the lack 
of data in questions surrounding the relationship between religious pro-
grams and professional expertise imparted regarding LGBT issues.94  In 
any event, it should be the profession that makes this determination inter-
nally. 
To be sure, the medical and mental health fields are not the only pro-
viders of professional training to face such concerns.  There is a considera-
ble body of scholarship on religious law schools, for instance.95  Nor are 
these issues solely domestic.96  But the two fields highlighted here concern 
today’s most politically and socially contested areas.  In the end, the im-
portant takeaway is that professional outlier status may be created in differ-
ent ways, including the institutional context in which the professional oper-
ates and education in which professional knowledge is imparted.  The 
reference point, however, is the knowledge basis of the profession and its 
shared ways of knowing and reasoning. 
II.  JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PROFESSIONAL OUTLIER STATUS 
This Part investigates what constitutes an appropriate basis for justify-
ing a professional’s outlier status.  It considers the interests of professionals 
and of knowledge communities, and client expectations toward them.  To 
the extent that a professional’s outlier status is grounded in disagreement 
based on shared notions of validity, departure from the knowledge commu-
nity’s insights must be permissible.  Indeed, dynamic development and re-
finement of professional insights will often depend on such divergent as-
sessments.  However, outlier status based on exogenous reasons 
undermines the status of the professional as a member of the knowledge 
community founded in shared notions of validity and common ways of 
knowing and reasoning.  This explains the initial distinction between inter-
nal and external outliers. 
 
 92 Randall Lehmann Sorenson & Shawn Hales, Comparing Evangelical Protestant Psychologists 
Trained at Secular Versus Religiously Affiliated Programs, 39 PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY/ 
  RESEARCH/PRACTICE/TRAINING 163 (2002). 
 93 Campbell, supra note 82, at 481. 
 94 Id. at 483. 
 95 See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce, Symposium Foreword: The Religious Lawyering Movement: An 
Emerging Force in Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075 (1998). 
 96 See, e.g., Trinity W. Univ. v. British Columbia Coll. of Teachers, 2001 S.C.C. 31 (2001) (con-
cerning the accreditation of a teacher training program); Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of Upper 
Canada, 2015 ONSC 4250 (July 2, 2015) (accreditation of a law school); Trinity W. Univ. v. 
Nova Scotia Barristers’ Soc’y, 2015 NSSC 25 (Jan. 28, 2015) (concerning recognition of law de-
grees from religious law school by provincial licensing bodies). 
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It will be the reasonable expectation of the knowledge community that 
the individual professional fully and accurately communicates the profes-
sion’s knowledge to the client.97  Correspondingly, the client seeking pro-
fessional advice reasonably may expect that she receives competent and 
comprehensive professional advice in accordance with the profession’s in-
sights.  In other words, the client expects that she will access the entire 
body of knowledge relevant to her problem that constitutes the state of the 
art in the field.  The normative corollary can be found in the law of profes-
sional malpractice where the standard of care against which the profession-
al’s advice is measured is determined by the profession itself: exercise of 
the profession according to the degree and skill of a well-qualified profes-
sional.  The knowledge community thus determines the benchmark against 
which the individual professional’s liability is assessed.98  This does not on-
ly mean what the professional says must be correct, it also means that it 
must be comprehensive. 
The distinction between internal and external outliers is a distinction in 
kind—namely, a different kind of justification for departure from profes-
sional knowledge.  While internal outliers justify their alternative assess-
ments by relying on the shared knowledge basis of the profession, external 
outliers justify their departure by reliance on exogenous factors.  Their dis-
agreement is premised on rejecting the shared way of knowing and reason-
ing due to exogenous beliefs.  By doing so, they place themselves outside 
of the knowledge community.  The remainder of this Part will defend the 
exclusion of external outliers from the knowledge community. 
The distinction between internal outliers giving good advice and inter-
nal outliers giving bad advice, by contrast, is a distinction in degree.  
Whether their advice clears the bar of “good advice” is for the knowledge 
community to decide.  Internal outliers may misuse the shared methodolo-
gy, resulting in bad advice.  But it is up to the knowledge community to de-
cide what the bar of good advice is, and what degree of departure is per-
missible.  I will return to this issue in Parts III and IV below. 
 
 97 There is another dimension that I subsume under the knowledge community’s expectations of the 
individual professional, but that others have identified separately as the expectation of the profes-
sional: “Reasonable belief about what a job entails is one measure of whether refusals of con-
science should be protected.”  Kent Greenawalt, Refusals of Conscience: What Are They and 
When Should They Be Accommodated?, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 47, 55 (2010).  Greenawalt points 
out that nurses trained at a time when abortion was illegal would not reasonably expect to be 
called upon to assist in such a procedure.  Id.  That is certainly true.  Under my theory of the pro-
fessions as knowledge communities, however, the job of the individual professional entails what-
ever the knowledge community defines it to be, even if its scope changes over time. 
 98 See infra Part III.A. 
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A.  External Outliers 
Taking account of the expectations toward professionals, this subpart 
explains why external outliers should be considered to have placed them-
selves outside of the knowledge community.  Through a lens of public rea-
son, the knowledge community’s expectations toward the professional and 
the client’s expectations toward the professional demand that any departure 
be based upon the shared knowledge basis.  But the defining feature of ex-
ternal outliers’ justifications for departure is that they are based on exoge-
nous reasons. 
One recent example involves pharmacists who refuse to advise clients 
on the availability of drugs they consider to be abortifacients.99  Other ex-
amples of restricting the range of available advice may include professional 
advice on assisted reproductive technology (“ART”) for same-sex cou-
ples.100  Yet another example involves crisis pregnancy centers, at least to 
the extent that they hold themselves out as providing professional advice. 
 
 99 Cf. Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1064 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding the Washington requirement that 
pharmacies dispense all prescription medications); see also Dennis Rambaud, Prescription Con-
traceptives and the Pharmacist’s Right to Refuse: Examining the Efficacy of Conscience Laws, 4 
CARDOZO PUB. LAW., POL. & ETHICS J. 195 (2006) (recounting instances of conscientious re-
fusal by pharmacists and analyzing related laws); Jane W. Walker, Comment, The Bush Admin-
istration’s Midnight Provider Refusal Rule: Upsetting the Emerging Balance in State Pharmacist 
Refusal Laws, 46 HOUSTON L. REV. 939 (2009) (recounting instances of conscientious refusal by 
pharmacists and analyzing midnight provider rule); Heather A. Weisser, Abolishing the Pharma-
cist’s Veto: An Argument in Support of a Wrongful Conception Cause of Action Against Pharma-
cists Who Refuse to Provide Emergency Contraception, 80 SO. CAL. L. REV. 865 (2007) (arguing 
against pharmacist choice in providing contraceptives); Lora Cicconi, Pharmacist Refusals and 
Third-Party Interests: A Proposed Judicial Approach to Pharmacist Conscience Clauses, 54 
UCLA L. REV. 709 (2007) (discussing pharmacist refusals); Matthew White, Conscience Clauses 
for Pharmacists: The Struggle to Balance Conscience Rights With the Rights of Patients and In-
stitutions, 2005 WISC. L. REV. 1611 (2005) (discussing pharmacist refusals); Charu A. Chandra-
sekhar, RX for Drugstore Discrimination: Challenging Pharmacy Refusals to Dispense Prescrip-
tion Contraceptives Under State Public Accommodations Laws, 70 ALB. L. REV. 55 (2006) 
(discussing pharmacist refusals); Sarah J. Vokes, Just Fill the Prescription: Why Illinois’ Emer-
gency Rule Appropriately Resolves the Tension Between Religion and Contraception in the 
Pharmacy Context, 24 L. & INEQ. 399 (2006) (discussing pharmacist refusals); Melissa Duvall, 
Pharmacy Conscience Clause Statutes: Constitutional Religious “Accommodations” or Uncon-
stitutional “Substantial Burdens” on Women?, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1485 (2006) (discussing con-
science clause statutes); Amy Bergquist, Note, Pharmacist Refusals: Dispensing (With) Religious 
Accommodation Under Title VII, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1073 (2006) (discussing pharmacist refusals); 
Brittany L. Grimes, Note, The Plan B for Plan B: The New Dual Over-the-Counter and Prescrip-
tion Status of Plan B and Its Impact Upon Pharmacists, Consumers, and Conscience Clauses, 41 
GA. L. REV. 1395 (2007) (evaluating the impact of Plan B’s over-the-counter status). 
100 Cf. Douglas NeJaime, Griswold’s Progeny: Assisted Reproduction, Procreative Liberty, and 
Sexual Orientation Equality, 124 YALE L.J. F. 340, 340–41 (2015) (“As same-sex couples have 
gained access to marriage, some who opposed same-sex marriage have shifted their views, ex-
pressing support for same-sex equality while attempting to limit its impact.  In particular, some 
now accept same-sex marriage while maintaining their commitment to biological, gender-
differentiated parenting.”).  However, it is doubtful that such restrictions specifically targeted at 
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The following discussion first distinguishes between motivations and 
justifications, animated by the idea of public reason.  In short, public justi-
fications should be based on reasons that individuals of divergent back-
grounds—moral, religious, and political—can accept as valid in a pluralist 
society.101  Translated to the professional realm, the shared acceptance of 
advice follows when it is based on justifications internal to the knowledge 
community.  The shared ways of knowing and reasoning are accepted as 
valid among members of the knowledge community irrespective of their 
personal commitments.  Likewise, clients seeking a professional’s advice 
will accept professional advice justified by the knowledge community’s 
shared ways of knowing and reasoning as such, whether or not their priors 
otherwise align with the advice-giving professional’s.  Acceptance of pro-
fessional advice follows from its nature as expert knowledge, not based on 
individual exogenous commitments.  Applied to the context of professional 
advice, when the justifications are exogenous, the dissenting professional 
typically does not serve the expectations of the knowledge community or 
individual clients. 
The two final subparts interrogate whether mitigating these expecta-
tions is possible by providing disclosures of professionals’ exogenous 
commitments to their clients, or whether departure from the professional 
consensus due to exogenous—and here, primarily religious—reasons is 
generally justifiable under an exemptions regime. 
1.  Motivations and Justifications 
External outliers base their divergence from professional consensus on 
exogenous reasons; often, their disagreement will be religiously motivated 
and therefore exogenous to the ways of knowing and reasoning of the 
knowledge community.  Take the pro-life pharmacist as an example.  Here, 
motivation and justification for refusing to provide comprehensive advice 
align: the motivating reason the pharmacist refuses to advise on certain 
drugs is his religious, political, or philosophical opposition to abortion.  
The justification is the same.  It does not matter whether scientifically the 
drugs act in a certain way, as long as the pharmacist believes that they do. 
 
gay parents are tenable: “State laws on assisted reproductive technology may still be based on an 
exclusive model of different sex couples, but that model will not survive.”  Lupu, supra note 22, 
at 7 n.21.  But see Christian Medical & Dental Associations, Assisted Reproductive Technology 
Ethics Statement (Jan. 22, 2017), http://cmda.org/resources/publication/assisted-reproductive-
technology-ethics-statement (emphasizing the heterosexual, married two-parent family). 
101 See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1996) (suggesting in large part that plural-
istic societies need to have reasonable rules for debate and discussion to bridge the gap between 
fundamentally opposed positions). 
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But motivation and justification do not necessarily align.  Outliers who 
justify their departure from the professional consensus in terms exogenous 
to professional discourse—such as religious outliers—must be distin-
guished from outliers who may have a religious disagreement with the pro-
fession, but who nonetheless purport to share the knowledge basis of the 
profession to support their views. 
For example, the National Association for Research and Therapy of 
Homosexuality (“NARTH”)—one of the last remaining professional organ-
izations that supports conversion therapy102—portrays itself as an alterna-
tive to the American Psychiatric Association.  A founding member of 
NARTH asserts that “NARTH came into existence in response to threats to 
take away the right of patients to choose therapy to eliminate or lessen 
same-sex attraction.”103  The group claims to “defend[] the right of thera-
pists to provide such treatment and provides a forum for the dissemination 
of research on homosexuality.”104  Importantly, the group explicitly invokes 
the knowledge basis and methodology of the profession: 
Concerned that professional organizations and publications in the mental health 
field have fallen under the control of those who would use them to forward so-
cial constructionist theories, political agendas, and advocacy research, NARTH 
has fought for a return to established theoretical approaches, solid research, 
therapy that puts the patient first, and freedom to discuss, debate, and disa-
gree.105 
The motivating factor for believing that homosexuality is wrong and must 
be remedied by therapy may be religious,106 but the organization explicitly 
claims to place itself within the discourse of the knowledge community. 
Thus, despite the perhaps religious motivation, the justification is framed in 
terms of scientific discourse of the profession. 
So what should we make of motivations and justifications for outlier 
status?  When motivation and justification align, and both are based on ex-
ogenous reasoning—as in the pro-life pharmacist example—the profes-
sional is an external outlier placing himself outside of the knowledge 
community.  The justification for departure at its core is a rejection of the 
 
102 On the role of NARTH in the JONAH litigation and exclusion of conversion therapy expert wit-
nesses, see infra notes 217, 242–265 and accompanying text. 
103 Benjamin Kaufman, Why NARTH? The American Psychiatric Association’s Destructive and 
Blind Pursuit of Political Correctness, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 423 (2002). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. (emphasis added). 
106 Id. (“When people are discriminated against on the basis of their religious beliefs or denied help 
that they believe is in their best interests, they need an advocate to defend their rights.”); id. at 
440 (“If this trend persists, persons with strongly held religious beliefs may be unwilling to seek 
help from professional therapists. Religious groups may be forced to act as alternative profes-
sional organizations, and the demand for the entire mental health profession will be substantially 
reduced.”). 
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knowledge community’s shared ways of knowing and reasoning.  But as 
long as the justification is framed in terms of the discourse of the 
knowledge community, I am inclined to consider the outliers as internal 
outliers.  Their justification (at least ostensibly) respects the shared ways of 
knowing and reasoning.  Does this invite dishonesty?  This invokes a gen-
eral problem in the theory of public reason.107  But as long as a professional 
justification is possible, I am inclined to disregard the potential dishonesty 
as to motives.  On a functional level, it will be virtually impossible for 
courts to make judgments about subjectivity in this area.  It will generally 
be possible, however, to presume honesty as to motive and judge the justi-
fication in relation to the knowledge community’s standards.  Indeed, this 
is analogous to the tort regime where professional advice is measured 
against the profession’s standard. 
True external outliers will base their justifications on exogenous fac-
tors.  Here, another useful illustration is provided by professional associa-
tions that explicitly frame their mission in religious terms.  Individual pro-
fessionals may understand their professional duty as part and parcel of their 
religious duty.108  The Christian Medical & Dental Associations 
(“CMDA”), for instance, with nearly 18,000 members strong, represents 
such professionals.109  CMDA’s Ethics and Scientific Statements “are 
based on scientific, moral and biblical principles.”110  The Homosexuality 
Ethics Statement, for example, sets forth a framework for viewing homo-
sexuality in biblical, social, and medical context 111  The medical factors, 
however, largely depart from scientific consensus.112  Notably, CMDA em-
 
107 See, e.g., Micah Schwartzman, The Sincerity of Public Reason, 19 J. POL. PHILOSOPHY 375 
(2011) (discussing the impact of background moral values on political debate, particularly on the 
sincerity of politically “reasonable” justifications for moral positions). 
108 See, e.g., Christian Medical & Dental Associations, Christian Physician’s Oath Ethics Statement 
(June 10, 2005), http://cmda.org/resources/publication/christian-physicians-oath-ethics-statement 
(“With gratitude to God, faith in Christ Jesus, and dependence on the Holy Spirit, I publicly pro-
fess my intent to practice medicine for the glory of God.”). 
109 Christian Medical & Dental Associations, About Our Organization, https://cmda.org/about/ 
(“Founded in 1931, CMDA provides programs and services supporting its mission to “change 
hearts in healthcare” with a current membership of nearly 18,000.”). 
110 Christian Medical & Dental Associations, CMDA’s Ethics and Scientific Statements, 
http://cmda.org/issues/page/cmdas-ethics-statements. 
111 Christian Medical & Dental Associations, Homosexuality Ethics Statement, (Apr. 21, 2016), 
http://cmda.org/resources/publication/homosexuality-ethics-statement. 
 112 Id.  They are: 
1. Among individuals who engage in homosexual acts, there is an increased incidence of 
drug or alcohol dependence, compulsive sexual behavior, anxiety, depression, and sui-
cide. These consequences are harmful to the health of same-sex patients and are asso-
ciated with increased medical costs to society. 
2. Some homosexual acts are physically harmful because they disregard normal human 
anatomy and function. These acts are associated with increased risks of tissue injury 
and transmission of infectious diseases. 
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braces conversion therapy and in doing so cites NARTH or NARTH-
affiliated individuals.113 
The religious justification is more clearly articulated in the CMDA 
statement on ART, in which it sorts available reproductive technologies in-
to “consistent with God’s design for reproduction,” “morally problematic,” 
and “inconsistent with God’s design for the family.”114  The family is de-
fined as a married, heterosexual couple, resting on explicitly religious 
terms where “marriage and the family are the basic social units designed by 
God.  Marriage is a man and a woman making an exclusive commitment 
for love, companionship, intimacy, spiritual union, and, in most cases, pro-
creation.”115  Providing professional advice concerning ART consistent 
with the ethics statement will necessarily limit the range of options other-
wise available.  And the justification for limiting professional advice will 
rest purely on exogenous considerations. 
Perhaps, then, those professionals whose justifications are based on ex-
ogenous factors constitute their own knowledge community, one that 
should not be held to conform to the standards of the profession.  Instead, 
perhaps they should be held to the standard of the “Christian doctor” or 
“Christian lawyer,” or the standard of a coreligionist in the same profes-
sion.  But here, the self-understanding of the group is relevant.  The 
CMDA, for instance, addresses this issue in its Professionalism Ethics 
Statement in which they define themselves as medical professionals.116  
Moreover, the CMDA Malpractice Ethics Statement explicitly references 
the standard of care applicable in ordinary physician malpractice.117  By 
these metrics, the CMDA sees itself as part of the knowledge community, 
not a particular sub-group or separate community.  To the extent that pro-
fessionals claim to be part of the knowledge community, however, they 
ought to be bound to its knowledge basis and methodology. 
 
3. Homosexual behavior can be changed, even when desire persists. There is valid evi-
dence that many individuals who chose to abstain from homosexual acts have been 
able to do so. 
   Id. 
113 See Christian Medical & Dental Associations, Homosexuality, https://cmda.org/library/doclib/ 
  homosexuality-ethics-statement-with-references-final-2016.pdf. 
114 See Christian Medical & Dental Associations, Assisted Reproductive Technology Statement (Apr. 
29, 2010), http://cmda.org/resources/publication/assisted-reproductive-technology- 
  ethics-statement. 
115 Id. 
116 See, e.g., Christian Medical & Dental Associations, History of Our Ministry, https://cmda.org/ 
  library/doclib/history-of-cmda.pdf. 
117 See, e.g., Christian Medical & Dental Associations, Malpractice Ethics Statement (May, 2000), 
http://cmda.org/resources/publication/malpractice-ethics-statement (“The ‘standard of care’ re-
fers to those acts which a reasonable physician of like training or skill would do in the same or 
similar situation.”). 
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As the CMDA examples illustrate, it may not always be easy to classify 
the justification as exogenous.  Moreover, the justification may differ from 
issue to issue.  With respect to immunization, for example, the CMDA 
“supports the current scientific literature that validates the general practice 
of immunization as a safe, effective, and recommended procedure.”118  
Generalizations, in short, are difficult in this area.  But the conceptual line 
to be drawn along a shared knowledge basis and methodology is theoreti-
cally consistent.  And typically, courts will be able to conduct the necessary 
fact-specific inquiry, as they already do so in other areas such as tort law 
and evidence. 
2.  Expectations 
The expectations of the knowledge community and of clients toward 
professionals provide another reason why external outliers should generally 
be considered to place themselves outside of the knowledge community.  
With respect to the professional’s advice-giving function, the knowledge 
community’s interest lies in having individual professionals render accu-
rate, comprehensive advice.  This does not occur when the individual pro-
fessional disseminates advice based on a knowledge basis exogenous to 
that of the knowledge community.  Correspondingly, the individual profes-
sional has an autonomy interest in communicating the message according 
to the standards of the profession to which she belongs.119  It is this bond 
that is destroyed when professionals place themselves outside the 
knowledge community for exogenous reasons.  In reciprocal fashion, the 
individual professional’s interest lies in preserving the integrity of the 
knowledge community’s insights just as the knowledge community’s inter-
ests lie in having the individual professional communicate its insights cor-
rectly. 
A critic might object that this understanding places the membership in a 
profession above other constitutive aspects of a professional’s identity.  I 
do not mean to suggest that all other aspects of a professional’s identity are 
secondary, and this is particularly true for the professional’s religious be-
liefs.  But the focus here is on the function of knowledge communities and 
the role of the advice-giving individual professional within the profession-
al-client relationship.  In his position as conduit between the knowledge 
community and the client, the defining feature in that particular relationship 
 
118 Christian Medical & Dental Associations, Immunization Ethics Statement, https://www.cmda 
.org/resources/publication/immunization-ethics-statement (Jan. 31, 2017). 
119 Haupt, supra note 6, at 1272–73 (arguing that this interest goes to the identity of the professional 
as a member of the profession). 
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is the professional role.  In the professional-client relationship, the individ-
ual rendering professional advice is a professional first. 
The professional-client relationship is typically characterized by an 
asymmetry of knowledge; the client seeks the professional’s advice pre-
cisely because of this asymmetry.  The very reason the professional’s ad-
vice is valuable to the client is thus predicated on the knowledge the pro-
fessional possesses and the client lacks.120  The client’s interests are only 
served if the professional communicates information that is accurate (under 
the knowledge community’s current assessment), reliable, and personally 
tailored to the specific situation of the listener.  To bridge the knowledge 
gap, and to ensure the protection of the client’s decisional autonomy inter-
ests, the professional has to communicate all information necessary to 
make an informed decision to the client.121  Viewed through a lens of pub-
lic reason from the perspective of the client, the client’s expectation is that 
the professional will not operate based on justifications that are not shared 
by the profession. 
If the client does not receive full information, she may not know what is 
being withheld, or even that any information is being withheld.122  Fur-
thermore, the client does not know what is contested professional 
knowledge and what is not.  A patient, for example, may encounter a doc-
tor who for religious reasons will not provide advice on certain treatment 
options or medications.  But the justification for these omissions will not be 
based on professional knowledge.  In the spirit of public reason, the client 
must reasonably be able to expect that professional advice will be based 
upon reasons internal to the knowledge community rather than individual, 
exogenous justifications for departure. 
3.  Disclosure 
Could this information deficit be cured by disclosure?  The advice-
giving professional could tell the client that the advice she dispenses is lim-
ited.  The state might even require that any professional whose advice de-
parts from the knowledge community’s insights due to exogenous justifica-
tions provide such a disclosure.  The previous discussion already addressed 
 
120 See, e.g., King v. Governor of the State of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 232 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Li-
censed professionals, through their education and training, have access to a corpus of specialized 
knowledge that their clients usually do not.  Indeed, the value of the professional’s services stems 
largely from her ability to apply this specialized knowledge to a client’s individual circumstanc-
es.”). 
121 Haupt, supra note 6, at 1271. 
122 See, e.g., Jill Morrison & Micole Allekotte, Duty First: Towards Patient-Centered Care and 
Limitations on the Right to Refuse for Moral, Religious or Ethical Reasons, 9 AVE MARIA L. 
REV. 141, 148–49 (2010). 
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some potential problems of disclosure in the healthcare infrastructure.123  A 
prominent current example of litigation over disclosure requirements in-
volves crisis pregnancy centers.124  Often linked to a religious organization, 
the mission of these centers is to dissuade women from terminating their 
pregnancy.125  This mission, however, is sometimes obscured from the ad-
vice-seeking client.126 
With respect to the counseling provided at these facilities, the threshold 
question is whether crisis pregnancy centers engage in commercial, profes-
sional, or some other kind of speech.  Courts have been ambiguous at best 
in classifying the advice dispensed at the centers.127  Nonetheless, some 
commentators have been quick to analyze the speech as commercial.128  
But doing so may rest on a misconception.129  Other scholars have called 
this classification as commercial speech into question.  As Jessie Hill notes, 
“[t]he counseling transaction itself looks like the kind of one-on-one, fidu-
 
123 See supra Part I.A.2. 
124 See generally, Evergreen Ass’n Inc. v. City of New York (Evergreen I), 801 F. Supp. 2d 197 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (enjoining New York disclosure law), aff’d in part and vacated in part, (Ever-
green II), 740 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014) (remanding for further proceedings) cert. denied 135 S. 
Ct. 435 (2014); Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery County (Centro Tepeyac I), 779 F. Supp. 2d 456 
(D. Md. 2011) (enjoining Maryland disclosure law), aff’d, (Centro Tepeyac II), 722 F.3d 184 
(4th Cir. 2013); Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns v. Mayor and City Council of Balti-
more, 721 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2013) (vacating injunction for failure to adhere to summary judg-
ment standards); Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1340–51 
(2014); B. Jessie Hill, Casey Meets the Crisis Pregnancy Centers, 43 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 59 
(2015); Kathryn E. Gilbert, Note, Commercial Speech in Crisis: Crisis Pregnancy Center Regu-
lations and Definitions of Commercial Speech, 111 MICH. L. REV. 591 (2013); Molly Duane, 
Note, The Disclaimer Dichotomy: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Speech in Disclo-
sure Ordinances Governing Crisis Pregnancy Centers and Laws Mandating Biased Physician 
Counseling, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 349 (2013); Megan Burrows, Note, The Cubbyhole Conun-
drum: First Amendment Doctrine in the Face of Deceptive Crisis Pregnancy Center Speech, 45 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 896 (2014); Alice X. Chen, Crisis Pregnancy Centers: Impeding the 
Right to Informed Decision Making, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 933 (2013); Kristen Gallacher, 
Protecting Women from Deception: The Constitutionality of Disclosure Requirements in Preg-
nancy Centers, 33 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 113 (2011). 
125 Corbin, supra note 124, at 1339–40. 
126 Id. at 1340. 
127 In Evergreen II, the Second Circuit left open which standard it applied (“[W]e need not decide 
the issue, because our conclusions are the same under either intermediate scrutiny . . . or strict 
scrutiny . . . .”). 740 F.3d at 245. The District Court in Centro Tepeyac I found the speech was 
neither “commercial, professional, [n]or any other form of speech calling for a lower level of 
scrutiny.”  Centro Tepeyac I, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 468.  The Fourth Circuit, upon review, “com-
mend[ed] the court for its careful and restrained analysis.”  Centro Tepeyac II, 722 F.3d at 192. 
128 See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 124, at 613–14 (arguing that, while some speech by the facilities 
may be entitled to strict scrutiny, advertisements and billboards by the facilities are commercial 
speech).  But see Corbin, supra note 124, at 1343 (“The courts usually found that the speech was 
not commercial speech . . . .”). 
129 Cf. Haupt, supra note 6, at 1264–68 (discussing and rejecting the analogy of commercial and 
professional speech). 
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ciary relationship that . . . appears to be the hallmark of professional 
speech.”130 
Given the stated mission of the centers, it seems clear that the advice 
rendered would generally not qualify as comprehensive and accurate pro-
fessional advice.131  At the same time, at least in some instances employees 
at these facilities may be holding themselves out as professionals, leading 
clients to expect professional advice.132  Assuming, then, that at least some 
crisis pregnancy centers should be considered to provide professional ad-
vice, the advice rendered must measure up to professional standards.133  
Thus, from a professional speech perspective, regulation of such speech is 
entirely unproblematic—because it is unprofessional advice to begin with. 
What about the disclosure requirements imposed by the state?134  In 
principle, such disclosure mechanisms will inform the client of the limited 
scope of professional advice.135  Similarly, doctor-patient matching, at least 
theoretically, might provide an attractive solution.136  In choosing their doc-
 
130 Hill, supra note 124, at 66 (“Unlike other false or unsubstantiated health claims that may be 
made in various fora, the CPC speech occurs within a counseling relationship in which the listen-
er puts trust in the presumed professional and assumes that the professional will act in her best 
interests, thus invoking the state’s particularly strong interest in protecting the listener.”). 
131 Corbin, supra note 124, at 1342 (“Counseling varies, but most versions would violate medical 
ethics, as the goal is not to fully and accurately inform women of their medical options but to 
convince them to forgo abortion by any means necessary.”); see also Aziza Ahmed, Informed 
Decision Making and Abortion: Crisis Pregnancy Centers, Informed Consent, and the First 
Amendment, 43 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 51, 52 (2015) (noting that misinformation “includes telling 
women that there is a link between abortion and breast cancer, that they will experience psycho-
logical distress following abortion, and that there is the possibility for future infertility following 
an abortion.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion, In California, Free Speech Meets Abortion, L.A. 
TIMES (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-1016-chemerinsky-
reproductive-fact-act-20151016-story.html (“Crisis pregnancy centers have been known to 
spread false medical information and use scare tactics to dissuade their clients from seeking abor-
tions.”). 
132 See Corbin, supra note 124, at 1350 (“Women who respond to ‘Pregnant?  Need Help?  You 
have options’ advertisements and are administered pregnancy tests by people in white lab coats 
are led to believe that medical professionals will give them accurate and impartial medical ad-
vice.  Instead, they are tricked into hearing false information and an ideological message.”). 
133 There may be other forms of recourse.  Certain activities could qualify as consumer fraud, for 
example, for the speech that falls into this category. 
134 See Reproductive FACT Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§	123470–123473 (West 2016) 
(requiring facilities to inform patients of alternative care). 
135 Under the California Reproductive FACT Act, licensed healthcare facilities must display the fol-
lowing notice: “California has public programs that provide immediate free or low-cost access to 
comprehensive family planning services (including all FDA-approved methods of contraception), 
prenatal care, and abortion for eligible women.  To determine whether you qualify, contact the 
county social services office at [insert the telephone number].”  Id. § 123472(a)(1).  Unlicensed 
facilities must display the following: “This facility is not licensed as a medical facility by the 
State of California and has no licensed medical provider who provides or directly supervises the 
provision of services.”  Id. §123472(b)(1). 
136 See, e.g., HOLLY FERNANDEZ LYNCH, CONFLICTS OF CONSCIENCE IN HEALTH CARE 79–97 
(2008) (describing doctor-patient matching, which allows a doctor to conscientiously object to 
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tors, “patients may consider not only the physician’s expertise, but also 
whether they have shared beliefs or points of view.”137  However, in prac-
tice, there is a significant filtering problem that may lead to inadequate 
communication of knowledge from doctor to patient.  Imagine a doctor in-
forming a patient that, due to his faith, he will dispense only advice that is 
consistent with his faith.  Even if the patient is of the same faith, it is at 
least questionable whether it will be obvious to her which advice is left out 
as inconsistent with the professional’s faith.  Just as professional 
knowledge communities are not monolithic, faith communities are not 
monolithic.  What is acceptable in light of religious doctrine for one mem-
ber of a particular religion may be unacceptable for a coreligionist.138  But 
even if disclosure puts the client on notice, the dissenting professional is 
still not communicating the full range of professional knowledge.  And it 
would reintroduce an element of paternalism—physicians alone deciding 
on behalf of the patient what information the patient needed to know.  On 
the tort side, this is exactly the situation to be remedied by the doctrine of 
informed consent.139  The American Medical Association puts it this way: 
“The patient’s right to self-decision can be effectively exercised only if the 
patient possesses enough information to enable an informed choice.”140  
Thus, a disclosure regime only partially cures the problems outlined in the 
prior discussion. 
 
performing a procedure if an alternative physician is available, and requiring the objecting doctor 
to perform if no other physician can reasonably be found). 
137 Sonia M. Suter, The First Amendment and Physician Speech in Reproductive Decision Making, 
43 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 22, 27 (2015). 
138 And even in hierarchically organized religions, individual members may depart from official 
doctrine in large numbers.  See, e.g., Michael Lipka, Majority of U.S. Catholics’ Opinions Run 
Counter to Church on Contraception, Homosexuality, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 19, 2013), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/09/19/majority-of-u-s-catholics-opinions-run-
counter-to-church-on-contraception-homosexuality/ (finding that U.S. Catholics disagree with 
Catholic doctrine on birth control and same sex marriage). 
139 Suter, supra note 137, at 27. 
140 Ahmed, supra note 131, at 52 (quoting American Medical Association, Opinion 8.08—Informed 
Consent).  But see Cameron O’Brien Flynn & Robin Fretwell Wilson, When States Regulate 
Emergency Contraceptives Like Abortion, What Should Guide Disclosure?, 43 J.L., MED. & 
ETHICS 72, 78 (2015) (arguing that “following professional norms may not yield disclosures con-
sistent with what most women say they want to know.”).  In the context of informed consent, 
Flynn and Wilson concede that “[g]enerally, the risks of a given health care procedure are scien-
tifically resolvable, and therefore patients can benefit from the measured judgment of health care 
professionals as a group.”  Id.  However, they argue that abortion is different: “But unlike ordi-
nary medical procedures, what constitutes life or when life begins are subjects that are not scien-
tifically resolvable.  A physician armed with medical knowledge cannot provide an answer to 
women that women themselves cannot supply to these questions.  Moreover, despite the allure of 
professional norms, sometimes deciding what counts as the professional view is not so 
easy . . . .” Id. at 79–80.  The solution, however, is more information rather than less.  And disa-
greements within the profession should be worked out within the knowledge community rather 
than decided via state regulation. 
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4.  Exemptions 
To what extent is the departure from expectations justified by exemp-
tions?  Writing more than a decade ago in the context of medical care, 
health law scholar Alta Charo posed the following set of questions: 
What does it mean to be a professional in the United States?  Does profession-
alism include the rather old-fashioned notion of putting others before oneself?  
Should professionals avoid exploiting their positions to pursue an agenda sepa-
rate from that of their profession?  And perhaps most crucial, to what extent do 
professionals have a collective duty to ensure that their profession provides 
nondiscriminatory access to all professional services?141 
Today, these questions remain largely unanswered—and since then, 
leading up to the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,142 and 
certainly in its aftermath, new sites of contestation have emerged.143  Con-
temporaneously, conscience exemptions have been at the forefront of legal 
and political debate for some time now, culminating most recently in the 
Hobby Lobby case.144  One reaction to the expansion of marriage equality 
has been to call for exemptions from generally applicable antidiscrimina-
tion laws.  These would include providers of professional services.145  The 
CMDA Same-Sex “Marriage” [sic] Public Policy Statement, for instance, 
strongly supports such measures.146  An expansive body of scholarship ad-
dresses the plethora of questions surrounding exemptions. 
My point here is narrow and conceptual, and concerns only the site of 
negotiation for potential exemptions granted to professionals refusing to 
provide comprehensive professional advice.  Exemptions for professionals 
should be negotiated within the knowledge community.  Indeed, historical-
ly, this has been the case in the health context: “In medicine, until recently, 
legislative protection has focused on those objections grounded in profes-
sional ethical obligations.”147  Objections to marriage equality, however, 
are unlikely to be rooted in professional norms: “Whereas doctors cite their 
obligation to preserve life to refuse assisted suicide, those who decline to 
 
141 R. Alta Charo, The Celestial Fire of Conscience—Refusing to Deliver Medical Care, 352 N. 
ENG. J. MED. 2471, 2473 (2005). 
142 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
143 See generally Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception, Abor-
tion, Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and the State, 53 B.C. L. REV. 
1417 (2012). 
144 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
145 Sepper, supra note 1, at 724 (“Religious organizations, small businesses, and professionals 
would be relieved of certain obligations of nondiscrimination and would avoid legal liability.”); 
id. at 743 (“[S]ome objectors could belong to professions characterized by moral complexity and 
shared ethics (including medicine).”). 
146 Same-Sex “Marriage” Public Policy Statement, CHRISTIAN MED. & DENTAL ASS’NS (Jan. 23, 
2016), https://cmda.org/resources/publication/same-sex-marriage-public-policy-statement. 
147 Sepper, supra note 1, at 726. 
Mar. 2017] UNPROFESSIONAL ADVICE 703 
 
perform IVF for lesbian couples cannot anchor their refusal in professional 
ethics . . . . Indeed, medical ethics prohibit such acts as impermissible dis-
crimination.”148  The same is true outside of the medical context.  As Eliza-
beth Sepper notes, “if a tax or family law attorney objected to serving gay 
married couples, he or she would be hard pressed to identify the ethical 
norm supporting the objection.”149 
A critic might object that the professions do not necessarily have a track 
record that makes them particularly trustworthy.  Consider the following 
examples: the American Medical Association supported the criminalization 
of abortion;150 homosexuality was considered a mental illness by profes-
sional groups until the 1970s;151 members of the American Psychological 
Association allegedly supported the C.I.A. torture program during the Bush 
administration;152 Office of Legal Counsel lawyers provided bad advice in 
the torture memos.153  How, then, can we trust professionals to properly ne-
gotiate conscience exemptions?  Perhaps the best answer is that among the 
finite number of potential decision makers, the professions are the least bad 
option.  State legislatures, as the examples throughout this Article show, 
are increasingly emboldened to explicitly contradict professional 
knowledge.  Courts may lack the expertise to evaluate the full effects of 
granting certain exemptions on the ability of professionals to provide ser-
vices.  In other words, deference to the professions on negotiating exemp-
tions may be a second-best, but still preferable option.  And the professions 
are capable of correcting course.154  Moreover, by giving the professions 
 
148  Id. at 743. 
149 Id. 
150 See Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective 
Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 1000–02 (noting that American Medical Asso-
ciation advocated for the criminalization of abortion and contraception); see also Reva B. Siegel, 
Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of 
Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 280–300 (1992). 
151 See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
152 See James Risen, American Psychological Association Bolstered C.I.A. Torture Program, Report 
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/01/us/report-says-
american-psychological-association-collaborated-on-torture-justification.html?smid=pl-share& 
  _r=0 (“The American Psychological Association secretly collaborated with the administration of 
President George W. Bush to bolster a legal and ethical justification for the torture of prison-
ers . . . .”); see also James Risen, Outside Psychologists Shielded U.S. Torture Program, Report 
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com /2015/07/11/us/psychologists-
shielded-us-torture-program-report-finds.html (describing the report that establishes a connection 
between American psychologists and the C.I.A. torture programs). 
153 Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Report Faults 2 Authors of Bush Terror Memos, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
19, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/20/us/politics/20justice.html?_r=0. 
154 See, e.g., James Risen, Psychologists Approve Ban on Role in National Security Interrogations, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/08/us/politics/psychologists-
approve-ban-on-role-in-national-security-interrogations.html (describing the American Psycho-
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the authority to self-regulate, and by decisions made in other areas of the 
law—most prominently, in the tort law governing professional malprac-
tice—the question has been resolved in favor of the professions despite 
such concerns beyond the narrow context of conscience exemptions.  The 
idea of symmetry between tort liability and First Amendment protection, 
then, normatively supports this deference. 
B.  Internal Outliers 
Internal outliers share the knowledge community’s notions of validity, 
methodology, and intersubjective understanding.  Their results deviate 
from the “mainstream;” yet, their outlier status is based on the application 
of the agreed-upon methods to the same data, only to reach divergent re-
sults.  Ultimately, internal outlier status is thus grounded in the same set of 
professional insights.  This is the key to understanding that knowledge 
communities are not monolithic.  The same data may be interpreted in sev-
eral ways.  As a matter of tort liability, the resulting professional advice, 
consequently, is “good” professional advice falling within the range of de-
fensible professional knowledge.155  Different assessments of shared 
knowledge, if valid under the agreed upon methodology, may produce 
good professional advice, even if it departs from the mainstream. 
But internal outliers can also produce bad professional advice.  If the 
assessment of the shared knowledge is faulty or based on methodological 
errors, it will not result in defensible professional advice. One example, 
discussed in more detail in Part IV, is the study linking certain childhood 
vaccines to autism.156 
The more difficult case is that in which outliers assert to be relying on 
the same knowledge basis without outright falsified or otherwise erroneous 
use of data.  Again, NARTH provides a useful example.  Under that 
group’s account, NARTH and the American Psychiatric Association oper-
ate based on different paradigms.157  The claim that the American Psychiat-
ric Association and other professional organizations in the mental health 
field have been hijacked by “gay activists” and research contrary to their 
goals has been silenced and scientists oppressed illustrates that NARTH re-
jects the same methods of reasoning while also asserting its competence in 
 
logical Association’s ban on any psychologist’s involvement in interrogation conducted by the 
United States). 
155 Haupt, supra note 6, at 1284–87. 
156 See infra Part IV.A.1. 
157 Kaufman, supra note 103, at 425 (“The paradigm of the gay activists holds that psychological 
theories and practice are social constructs and, therefore, are subject to political negotiation.  The 
paradigm of NARTH holds that treatment provided by therapists should be guided by cumulative 
clinical experience and valid research carried out by responsible professionals.”). 
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the same field.  Indeed, they portray the debate as one “within mental 
health professional organizations.”158  Thus, they do not purport to be part 
of a different knowledge community.  The argument, rather, is that political 
pressure led to the delisting of homosexuality as a mental disorder from the 
DSM in 1973: “A review of the history . . . reveals . . . that the decision 
was not based on science but was the response of an organization under 
siege by gay activists.”159  In other words, NARTH accuses the mainstream 
of having attained outlier status.  These competing claims can only be 
overcome by the knowledge community itself. 
Thus, for internal outliers we must decide whose advice clears the bar 
of good professional advice and whose advice does not.  The remainder of 
this Article is concerned only with internal outliers. 
III.  DEFINING THE SCOPE OF DEFENSIBLE KNOWLEDGE: OUTLIERS IN 
TORT LAW AND EVIDENCE 
In order to determine the range of acceptable advice within the 
knowledge community, it is helpful to interrogate two areas of the law that 
have dealt with similar issues: the tort law of professional malpractice and 
the law of evidence on expert testimony.  What is the scope of good advice 
for First Amendment purposes?  To answer this question, this Part brings 
these two areas of law into the conversation that have traditionally asked 
similar questions, and that therefore may provide guidance on how to draw 
the line between professional and unprofessional advice. 
Both tort law and the law of evidence governing the admissibility of 
expert testimony have long acknowledged that knowledge communities are 
not monolithic.160  Both provide normative support to the position that the 
distinction between good and bad advice should be drawn by the 
knowledge community along the lines of a shared methodology and shared 
ways of knowing and reasoning.  Whether advice based on a shared meth-
odology and common ways of knowing and reasoning clears the bar of 
good advice on the substance, moreover, is also up to the knowledge com-
munity.  Additionally, from an institutional competence and workability 
standpoint, both tort law and the law of evidence governing the admissibil-
 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 433. 
160 The two interact in a significant way.  See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye 
or Daubert Matter?  A Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 472–73 
(2005) (“In federal courts, where the decision is legally binding, Daubert has become a potent 
weapon of tort reform by causing judges to scrutinize scientific evidence more closely.  Tort re-
form efforts often focus on medical malpractice, products liability, and toxic torts—all cases in 
which scientific evidence is likely to play a decisive or at least highly influential role.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
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ity of expert testimony illustrate that courts are able to accommodate the 
fact that a range of knowledge may constitute good advice. 
This Part first turns to the treatment of outliers in tort law, which has 
traditionally accounted for the fact that a range of opinions may be valid for 
purposes of defending against claims of professional malpractice liability.  
In particular the “respectable minority” or “two schools of thought” doc-
trines, which are available as defenses against malpractice claims in many 
jurisdictions, serve this function.  Ultimately, it is up to the knowledge 
community to determine what constitutes good advice—for malpractice li-
ability and for First Amendment purposes alike.  First Amendment protec-
tion of professional speech thus constitutes the flip side of imposing mal-
practice liability.  Conceptually, they are “two sides of the same coin.”161 
This Part then turns to the law of evidence.  Robert Post pointed out the 
parallels between the formation of expert knowledge and the law of evi-
dence: “We rely on expert ‘knowledge’ precisely because it has been vetted 
and reviewed by those whose judgment we have reason to trust . . . . This is 
explicitly the perspective adopted by federal courts when they determine 
whether to admit expert testimony . . . under Federal Rule of Evidence 
702.”162  Professionals, importantly, are experts recognized under FED. R. 
EVID. 702, though the category of experts under that rule is much larger.163  
Whether expert testimony is admissible and subject only to cross-
examination and counter-experts, or whether it is to be excluded provides a 
micro-scale study of the functioning of expert opinions outside the court-
room setting.  In the modern litigation setting, “the twentieth-century trial 
judge turned into an active gatekeeper, charged with the responsibility of 
 
161 Haupt, supra note 6, at 1285. 
162 POST, supra note 16, at 8.  At the same time, Post juxtaposes this understanding of expert 
knowledge with underlying First Amendment interests: “The continuous discipline of peer judg-
ment, which virtually defines expert knowledge, is quite incompatible with deep and fundamen-
tal First Amendment doctrines that impose a ‘requirement of viewpoint neutrality’ on regulations 
of speech and that apply ‘the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or 
impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content.’”  Id. at 9 (citations omitted).  
The Eleventh Circuit en banc decision in Wollschlaeger IV notably disregarded this incompatibil-
ity of expert knowledge and viewpoint neutrality.  Haupt, supra note 14 (criticizing the Court’s 
decision in Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017)). 
163 FED. R. EVID. 702 states that: 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or edu-
cation may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: 
 (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; 
 (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
 (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 
 (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. 
  Id.  
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screening unreliable scientific evidence away from the jury.”164  The under-
lying interests—ascertaining the reliability of opinions—are the same.  
Thus, both tort law and the law of evidence offer important insights that 
can guide theorizing the boundaries of First Amendment protection for pro-
fessional speech. 
A.  Tort Law 
Tort law sanctions unprofessional advice as professional malpractice or, 
in the medical context, as medical malpractice.  Processes of professionali-
zation are mirrored in the emergence of tort causes of action for profes-
sional malpractice.  Take the mental health field as an example.  Mental 
health providers find themselves increasingly exposed to malpractice 
claims as the field becomes increasingly science-based and standards of 
care become entrenched.165  The irony is not lost on commentators who 
point out that the very fact that treatments have improved creates the op-
portunity for recipients of such care “to pursue tort claims challenging the 
adequacy of the care they received.”166  A variety of mental healthcare pro-
viders may be the target of such claims: physicians such as psychiatrists, as 
well as psychologists, social workers, and counselors.167  Conceptually, it is 
important to remember that the profession sets the standard of care in these 
cases.168  While there has been a shift from the customary practice standard, 
which provided “safety in numbers,” to the reasonably prudent physician 
standard, which relies more on an evidence-based approach than customary 
 
164 Tal Golan, Revisiting the History of Scientific Expert Testimony, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 879, 880 
(2008). 
165 See Thomas L. Hafemeister, Leah G. McLaughlin & Jessica Smith, Parity at a Price: The 
Emerging Professional Liability of Mental Health Providers, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29, 31–32 
(2013) (arguing, for example, that higher damages are awarded because science has provided a 
better understanding of psychological harm); see also Steven R. Smith, Mental Health Malprac-
tice in the 1990s, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 209, 210–11 (1991) (describing an “avalanche of claims” 
against physicians for medical malpractice) (quoting J. ROBERTSON, PSYCHIATRIC 
MALPRACTICE: LIABILITY OF MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 5 (1988)).  The same was true in 
medical malpractice in the nineteenth century.  See, e.g., Catherine T. Struve, Doctors, the Ad-
versary System, and Procedural Reform in Medical Liability Litigation, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 
943, 950 (2004) (noting that “progress in medical knowledge also led to malpractice suits.”). 
166 Hafemeister, McLaughlin & Smith, supra note 165, at 33; see also Struve, supra note 165, at 948 
(“Improvements in medical knowledge and technology have heightened consumer expectations, 
and have led to lawsuits over imperfect results where previously—under less sophisticated treat-
ment—no suit would have been possible.”). 
167 See Hafemeister, McLaughlin & Smith, supra note 165, at 36 (“Suits targeting nonphysicians are 
typically referred to as professional liability claims, while suits aimed at physicians are catego-
rized as medical malpractice claims. Their basic nature is similar, although the terminology may 
differ somewhat.”) (footnote omitted). 
168 Id. at 38. 
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practices,169 it is the profession itself that determines what constitutes rea-
sonable care, and courts have long awarded deference to the profession in 
such cases.170  Expert testimony typically establishes what qualifies as the 
applicable standard of care.171 
The development of the standard of care results from contestation with-
in the knowledge community.  Scholars acknowledge that, given the “lack 
of consensus regarding the diagnosis of mental disorders and the appropri-
ate course of treatment for a given diagnosis,” it is difficult to establish the 
standard of care.172  In the mental health field, “the defining question in 
these cases is often whether the mental health provider, practicing in a field 
rife with uncertainty but in which substantial empirical progress is being 
made, made an error that should incur liability.”173  The tort law of profes-
sional malpractice, in other words, takes into account the changing nature 
of the profession. 
Doctrinally, tort law manifests its acknowledgement that a range of 
opinions may exist in any given field in the “respectable minority” or “two 
schools of thought” doctrine, which is a defense against malpractice claims 
in many jurisdictions.174  It states that “[w]here two or more schools of 
thought exist among competent members of the medical profession con-
cerning proper medical treatment for a given ailment, each of which is sup-
ported by responsible medical authority, it is not malpractice to be among 
the minority . . . who follow one of the accepted schools.”175  This doctrine 
explicitly accommodates the range of professional opinions.  The bench-
mark for liability will be established by reference to that particular school 
of thought: “The ‘school of thought’ to which mental health providers be-
long can have considerable significance in a professional liability suit, as 
their actions will typically be judged against what a reasonable practitioner 
of that school of thought would have done under similar circumstances.”176 
 
169 See, e.g., Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the 
Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 173 (2000) (discussing the rise of the reasonable phy-
sician standard in determining medical malpractice in American jurisprudence). 
170 Hafemeister, McLaughlin & Smith, supra note 165, at 38–40 (citing Pike v. Honsinger, 49 N.E. 
760 (N.Y. 1898)) (expanding on the reasonable physician standard and the deference courts pro-
vide to professional judgment). 
171 Id. at 43; Struve, supra note 165, at 945 (“In many malpractice cases, each element of the 
claim—standard of care, breach, causation, and damages—requires medical expert testimony.  
Party-retained experts are the standard source of such expertise in the United States.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
172 Hafemeister, McLaughlin & Smith, supra note 165, at 43. 
173 Id. at 40 (footnote omitted). 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 41 (quoting Chumbler v. McClure, 505 F.2d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 1974)). 
176 Hafemeister, McLaughlin & Smith, supra note 165, at 52. 
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Ambiguity persists both in terms of quantity and quality as courts are 
hesitant to give numerical guidance on how large the minority must be or 
what counts as recognized and respected knowledge.177  Especially with re-
spect to new developments, courts have noted that a publication require-
ment would be problematic.178  Notwithstanding these ambiguities, the 
conceptually significant point is that the doctrine accommodates the fact 
that there may not be a single correct answer when it comes to professional 
knowledge.  Institutionally, moreover, it does not force courts to function 
as the referee choosing among contested expert knowledge. 
Critics suggest that the doctrine permits unproven or ineffective treat-
ment, which is particularly relevant in a field such as mental healthcare, 
“where studies of the efficacy of various treatment alternatives are often 
lacking or highly contentious.”179  Moreover, the doctrine is important 
“when traditional treatments are called into question by emerging ap-
proaches.”180  Especially in a divided field such as mental health, where 
pharmacotherapy and psychoanalysis arguably embody divergent ap-
proaches, “if [one] orientation falls out of style or is deemed inappropriate 
to address a client’s condition, its practitioners may be subject to liabil-
ity.”181  If the law were to privilege pharmacotherapy, for instance, it 
“would enhance the risk of liability for practitioners who primarily use tra-
ditional, psychoanalytic methods of treatment or other nonpharmaceutical 
approaches.  However, it also suggests physicians may face liability for 
failing to refer to a nonmedical mental health practitioner a patient who 
might be better served by receiving a treatment modality that is not focused 
on pharmaceutical agents.”182  As available treatment options multiply and 
treatment outcomes improve,183 individual providers must therefore be 
aware of the alternatives. 
How substantial the disagreement within the profession is, moreover, 
may itself be contested.  In the mental healthcare context, some see psycho-
therapy and psychopharmacology not as antithetical but rather as comple-
mentary.184  The courts cannot (and should not) be the arbiters of such dis-
 
177 Tim Cramm, Arthur J. Hartz & Michael D. Green, Ascertaining Customary Care in Malpractice 
Cases: Asking Those Who Know, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699, 705 (2002) (citing Jones v. 
Chidester, 610 A.2d 964, 969 (Pa. 1992)). 
178 See id. at 969 n.21 (citing Gala v. Hamilton, 715 A.2d 1108, 1111 (Pa. 1998)). 
179 Hafemeister, McLaughlin & Smith, supra note 165, at 41. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 42. 
182 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
183 See id. at 48–52 (providing an overview of the developments in the mental health area since the 
mid-twentieth century, resulting in the rise of psychopharmacology and psychotherapy). 
184 See, e.g., Richard A. Friedman, Psychiatry’s Identity Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2015, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/19/opinion/psychiatrys-identity-crisis.html (arguing for in-
creased psychotherapy research alongside pharmacological research). 
710 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 19:3 
 
agreement.  Rather, this state of internal contestation “suggests that mental 
health practitioners, regardless of their preferred treatment approach, need 
to remain aware of and be conversant regarding the potential benefits—and 
risks—of alternative treatment courses and refer their clients to other prac-
titioners when these alternatives better meet their needs.”185  Ultimately, 
this calls for greater engagement with the range of professional knowledge 
available.  Thus, “to avoid liability when there are several courses of treat-
ment available and the most appropriate choice is not clear, mental health 
providers should obtain a consultation from someone with expertise regard-
ing these alternatives.”186  And, on the liability side, “failure to obtain a 
needed referral or consult when treating a client can constitute a breach of 
the standard of care and result in liability for the provider.”187  Here, again, 
conversion therapy provides a useful example, as 
different orientations have grown and faded in popularity over the years, with 
some discredited and associated professionals found liable when their clients 
experienced harm.  For example, “conversion therapy,” a school of thought that 
had a significant number of adherents at one time, subsequently fell out of fa-
vor, and its practitioners became the target of numerous professional liability 
claims.188 
These examples from contested areas of mental health illustrate how 
existing tort doctrines deal with the range of professional advice, and how 
emergent and refuted knowledge are treated with respect to professional 
malpractice claims.  The First Amendment can learn from this area in its 
explicit acknowledgement of a range of good advice.  By conceptualizing 
First Amendment protection as the flip side of malpractice liability, defer-
ence to the knowledge community on the substance of advice follows.  The 
takeaway can be boiled down to two simple, but critical, insights: first, 
there may not be a single right answer but rather a range of valid opinions 
that constitute good professional advice; second, the knowledge communi-
ty—rather than the courts or legislatures—determines what clears the bar 
of good advice. 
B.  Evidence 
Looking at the treatment of expert witnesses in the law of evidence is 
particularly instructive because the considerations underlying admissibility 
of expert testimony in the microcosm of the courtroom essentially mirror 
considerations underlying the role of the First Amendment.  Can the adver-
 
185 Hafemeister, McLaughlin & Smith, supra note 165, at 53–54 (suggesting that physicians should 
utilize more than one school of thought to best treat patients). 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 54. 
188 Id. at 52. 
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sary system provide tools, such as cross-examination or counter-evidence, 
to weed out “bad” expert opinions?  These tools mirror the marketplace 
idea and the notion of speech and counter-speech.  Or does proper admin-
istration of the system instead require the exclusion of “bad” experts?189  
Doing so would parallel the exclusion of outliers from First Amendment 
protection.  What can First Amendment theory learn from the treatment of 
experts in the law of evidence?190 
The common law largely trusted procedural tools to ensure reliability of 
expert witnesses’ testimony.191  Since judges were deemed to have inade-
quate knowledge of the substantive areas of testimony, the common law 
did not provide the judge tools to substantively evaluate expert testimony.  
Instead, the adversary system’s tools of cross-examination and counter-
experts were entrusted to procure reliable testimony.  With respect to scien-
tific evidence, however, the standard articulated in Frye v. United States 
demanded “general acceptance in the particular field” governed.192  In an 
attempt to reconcile heightened concerns about reliability with persisting 
 
189 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 664 (5th ed. 2012) 
(“Daubert came amidst increasing concern over ‘junk science’ . . . .”); Frederick Schauer & Bar-
bara A. Spellman, Is Expert Evidence Really Different?, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2013) 
(describing Daubert as “setting out a list of factors designed principally to keep so-called junk 
science out of the courtroom”) (footnote omitted); Cheng & Yoon, supra note 160, at 474 (“Un-
der this view, the real contribution of the Daubert decision was not in creating a new doctrinal 
test, but rather in raising the overall awareness of judges—in all jurisdictions—to the problem of 
unreliable or ‘junk’ science.”).  On “junk science,” see generally PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S 
REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991). 
190 This analogy is based on an oversimplification, of course.  Even under Daubert, the judge as 
gatekeeper is not intended 
to decide that the testimony is right or wrong or to displace the adversary system.  That 
system depends on cross-examination and allowing the other side to offer its own coun-
ter-proof, and these mechanisms put before the trier of fact the necessary information to 
make a considered judgment, to decide which side should carry the day. 
  MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 189, at 651 (footnote omitted).  However, “Daubert ex-
pects judges to decide the question whether the theories, techniques, and data as applied can be 
trusted.”  Id.  Therefore, the analogy still stands.  First Amendment protection of professional 
speech does not eliminate the mechanisms of speech and counter speech.  Second opinions, in 
other words, remain permissible and relevant.  First Amendment protection of professional 
speech, and corresponding lack of protection for “unprofessional” speech, only limits the range 
of acceptable advice to that based on the knowledge community’s range of acceptable insights. 
191 See generally TAL GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS OF NATURE: THE HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC 
EXPERT TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (2004); Golan, supra note 164; Learned Hand, 
Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40 
(1901) (providing a historical perspective). 
192 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (“Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the 
line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.  Somewhere in this 
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a 
long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or 
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have 
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”) (emphasis added). 
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skepticism about the judge’s role to substantively evaluate scientific evi-
dence, at the most basic level, the Frye test “deferred to prevailing thinking 
and practices in the scientific field.”193 
The Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
addressed the standard set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence, which 
superseded Frye.194  Frye still governs in a number of states though not in 
the federal courts and a majority of states where instead the Daubert test is 
followed.195  Moreover, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael extended Daubert 
beyond scientific testimony to all expert testimony.196  Under Daubert, 
“general acceptance” is still one of the factors, though unlike in Frye, it is 
not the only one.197  Other factors include testing, peer review, and error 
rates.198  Both Frye and Daubert are designed to determine the reliability of 
the science offered.199 
Daubert makes the judge the gatekeeper of scientific and other expert 
evidence.200  Where “the law deferred to the scientific community on the 
question whether answers that scientists provide are sufficiently grounded 
in theory and practice to be trusted and acted upon by courts” before, 
Daubert asks judges “independently to appraise what science has to offer, 
in effect screening out evidence offered as science if it is invalid or unrelia-
ble.”201  But the shift of decision-making power from the scientific com-
 
193 PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, MYRNA S. RAEDER & DAVID CRUMP, EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL 315 (5th 
ed. 2007). 
194 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (“[T]he Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence . . . .”). 
195 Cheng & Yoon, supra note 156, at 472–73. 
196 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (“We conclude that Daubert’s general holding—setting forth the trial 
judge’s general ‘gatekeeping’ obligation—applies not only to testimony based on ‘scientific’ 
knowledge, but also to testimony based on ‘technical’ and ‘other specialized’ knowledge.”). 
197 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (“Frye made ‘general acceptance’ the exclusive test for admitting ex-
pert scientific testimony.  That austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials.”); see also Kumho, 526 U.S. at 156 
(referencing “general acceptance” in expanding Daubert-style judicial gatekeeper function to 
non-scientific experts); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 189, at 650 (noting how “general 
acceptance” was “all-important” in Frye but only a relevant consideration in Daubert); Christo-
pher B. Mueller, Daubert Asks the Right Questions: Now Appellate Courts Should Help Find the 
Right Answers, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 987, 989 (2003) (noting that “Daubert . . . asks directly 
the question that Frye put only indirectly”). 
198 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94. 
199 Mueller, supra note 197, at 989; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 189, at 654 (“Daubert 
said the trial judge is to decide whether the evidence is ‘reliable’ enough to be considered.”). 
200 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (“[U]nder the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scien-
tific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”); see also MUELLER & 
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 189, at 649–50 (explaining how the “crux of it [Daubert] is that courts 
act as gatekeepers when it comes to scientific (and now technical) evidence”). 
201 Mueller, supra note 197, at 987; see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 189, at 654 
(“Daubert said the trial judge is to decide whether the evidence is ‘reliable’ enough to be consid-
ered.  In performing this function, Daubert did not want the judge to take either the word of the 
expert or the representations of the proponent as definitive.”). 
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munity to the judiciary202 may have little practical effect.  In practice, it is 
likely that judges under both regimes essentially make the same inquiry, 
focusing on general acceptance.  Indeed, scholars point out that while 
Daubert makes it “the job of courts to appraise science, and courts are not 
simply to defer to the scientific community on the question whether evi-
dence presented as science is valid and reliable,” they still are charged “to 
judge science by the standards that scientists deploy in judging science.”203  
And in doing so, “Rule 706 allows the court at its discretion to procure the 
assistance of an expert of its own choosing.”204 
Studies suggest that “while the Daubert decision itself may have raised 
judicial scrutiny of scientific evidence across the board, courts in practice 
engage in essentially the same analysis regardless of whether their jurisdic-
tion is formally Frye or Daubert.”205  Scholars thus note “that the power of 
the Supreme Court’s Daubert decision was not so much in its formal doc-
trinal test, but rather in its ability to create greater awareness of the prob-
lems of junk science.  This suggests that courts apply some generalized 
level of scrutiny when considering the reliability of scientific evidence, re-
gardless of the governing standard.”206  Both ask the same fundamental 
questions regarding general acceptance in terms of quality and quantity: 
who (or how many) has to accept what?207  Over time, however, “the range 
of reasonable difference” will be determined.208  In Kumho, for instance, 
the expert’s testimony “fell outside the range where experts might reasona-
bly differ.”209 
The focus on methodology in Daubert210 means that “sharply conflict-
ing expert opinions can all pass muster” and “[a]ccepting the expertise of 
one witness does not entail rejecting the expertise of another witness who 
has come to the opposite conclusion.”211  With respect to the range of ac-
ceptable knowledge, “Daubert means that proponents may sometimes pre-
sent new conclusions based on old data that have led others to contrary 
conclusions.”212  Yet, the underlying concept of the law of evidence does 
privilege existing knowledge and, at a very basic level, causes a problem 
 
202 Cheng & Yoon, supra note 160, at 471–72. 
203 Mueller, supra note 197, at 1007 (emphasis added). 
204 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. 
205 Cheng & Yoon, supra note 160, at 478. 
206 Id. at 503. 
207 ROTHSTEIN, RAEDER & CRUMP, supra note 193, at 339–40. 
208 Id. at 356. 
209 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 153 (1999). 
210 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (“The focus, of course, must be solely 
on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate.”). 
211 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 189, at 651. 
212 Id. at 650. 
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for those ahead of the curve.213  Indeed, the Daubert court itself was cogni-
zant of this issue.214 
Daubert places significant weight on “the scientific method.”  This mir-
rors the knowledge community’s shared notions of validity and common 
ways of knowing and reasoning.215  The judge does not decide on the sub-
stantive accuracy of the expert’s testimony; likewise, the substantive con-
tent of good advice is up to the knowledge community.  Both conceptually 
and from an institutional perspective, then, the law of evidence can inform 
the treatment of professional advice as a First Amendment matter. 
IV.  PROFESSIONAL AND UNPROFESSIONAL ADVICE IN PRACTICE 
Only good advice should be protected as professional speech.  Bad ad-
vice is subject to professional malpractice liability, and the First Amend-
ment provides no defense.  Applying the theory of First Amendment pro-
tection for professional speech based on an understanding of the 
professions as knowledge communities to a range of controversial cases, 
this Part illustrates how professional and unprofessional advice can be dis-
tinguished.  All of the instances discussed in this Part concern internal out-
liers.  Characteristically, these professionals’ advice may depart from the 
“mainstream” of the knowledge community, but it is nonetheless based on 
the same data, using shared methods of knowing and reasoning and a 
shared methodology in evaluating the data. 
A.  Tested and Refuted Knowledge 
The discussion of tested and refuted knowledge provides examples of 
the outright misuse of data, as in the MMR vaccine study, as well as the 
migration of once-accepted advice from the center to the periphery and 
eventually outside of the realm of shared knowing and reasoning or, in the 
language of Kumho, “outside the range where experts might reasonably dif-
fer.”216  Proponents of conversion therapy, as will be shown, are in the pro-
 
213 See ROTHSTEIN, RAEDER & CRUMP, supra note 193, at 351  (“Many post-Daubert civil cases 
have been similarly cautious about admitting scientific evidence.”). 
214 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 (“We recognize that, in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no 
matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic in-
sights and innovations.”). 
215 Cf. Jennifer E. Laurin, Criminal Law’s Science Lag: How Criminal Justice Meets Changed Sci-
entific Understanding, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1758 (2015) (“[I]t is not too idealized a view of 
expert testimony to acknowledge that scientific experts are commonly accountable to a broader 
professional community that provides greater accountability and indicia of reliability than many 
fact witnesses.”). 
216 Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 153 (1999); see also supra note 209 and ac-
companying text. 
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cess of shifting from internal to external outliers.  The treatment of expert 
witnesses in recent conversion therapy litigation reflects this shift. 
One way in which formerly good professional advice can become un-
professional advice is through advances in the field.  Hypotheses are sub-
ject to falsification, and when insights are tested and refuted, the result is 
that knowledge based on this data is rejected by the field. One court 
summed up this situation as follows: “[T]he theory that homosexuality is a 
disorder is not novel but – like the notion that the earth is flat and the sun 
revolves around it – instead is outdated and refuted.”217  Putting aside 
whether this characterization is exactly on point, the notion underlying this 
statement is what matters: something that once was believed to be axiomat-
ic has been rejected by the knowledge community.218 
1.  MMR Vaccine 
In early 2015, reports of a measles outbreak originating at Disneyland 
in California brought renewed focus to communities refusing to vaccinate 
children.219  Aside from medical reasons that make vaccination impossi-
ble,220 parents cited either religious or “lifestyle” objections.  In some in-
stances, those parents relied on a discredited, and subsequently retracted, 
study that linked childhood mumps, measles and rubella (“MMR”) vac-
cinations to autism.221  As Erwin Chemerinsky and Michele Goodwin dis-
cuss, there was a noticeable increase in parents refusing to vaccinate their 
 
217 Opinion Relating to Plaintiff's Motion to Bar JONAH's Experts at *24, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. 
HUD-L-5473-12, 2015 WL 609436, at *9 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 5, 2015) (granting 
plaintiffs' motion to bar five of JONAH's experts and partially granting their motion to bar the 
sixth). 
218 See also Marie-Amélie George, Expressive Ends: Understanding Conversion Therapy Bans, 68 
ALA. L. REV. 793 (2017) (tracing the history of the move of conversion therapy out of the medi-
cal mainstream). 
219 See, e.g., Editorial, Reckless Rejection of the Measles Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/03/opinion/reckless-rejection-of-the-measles-vaccine.html. 
220 Tamar Lewin, Sick Child’s Father Seeks Vaccination Requirement in California, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/29/us/father-of-boy-with-leukemia-asks-
california-school-officials-to-bar-unvaccinated-students.html. 
221 Michael Specter, A Death from Measles, THE NEW YORKER (July 3, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-death-from-measles; Clyde Haberman, A Discre-
cited Vaccine Study’s Continuing Impact on Public Health, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/02/us/a-discredited-vaccine-studys-continuing-impact-on-
public-health.html (both discussing AJ Wakefield et al., Ileal-lymphoid-nodular Hyperplasia, 
Non-specific Colitis, and Pervasive Developmental Disorder in Children, 351 THE LANCET 637 
(1998) (Retracted)); see also The Editors of The Lancet, Retraction—Ileal-lymphoid-nodular 
Hyperplasia, Non-specific Colitis, and Pervasive Developmental Disorder in Children, 375 THE 
LANCET 445 (2010). 
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children based on a “medically unsupported theory that inoculation could 
lead to autism among children.”222 
While the question of objections to vaccinations primarily concerns 
claims of parental rights and religious exemptions,223 not professional ad-
vice, the discredited autism link illustrates an instance of “tested and refut-
ed” knowledge.  The autism link ostensibly was established by interpreting 
the knowledge community’s shared body of knowledge, using scientific 
methodology.  But the study was flawed,224 and the knowledge community 
refuted its assertions.225  In short, the study failed to survive the knowledge 
community’s test of falsification.  In addition, the author of the study was 
stripped of his medical license.226  This, in a sense, represents the easy case 
of tested and refuted knowledge. 
2.  Conversion Therapy 
One particularly rich and currently unfolding example of how previous-
ly accepted advice becomes bad advice involves the now-discredited prac-
tice of conversion therapy or “sexual orientation change efforts” (“SOCE”).  
Most recently, Connecticut passed legislation prohibiting licensed mental 
health providers from offering conversion therapy for minors.227 Such laws 
are also in effect in California,228 New Jersey,229 Oregon,230 Illinois,231 and 
the District of Columbia.232  Similar legislation is pending in a number of 
other states,233 and federal legislation was introduced in the House in May 
2015.234  The Governor of New York implemented measures aimed at end-
 
222 Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Compulsory Vaccination Laws Are Constitutional, 110 
NW. U. L. REV. 589, 591–92 (2016) (discussing the effects of the discredited Wakefield study). 
223 See id. at 604–11 (explaining “why neither the claimed right of religious freedom nor the assert-
ed right of parents to control the upbringing of their children justifies a constitutional exemption 
from compulsory vaccination requirements”). 
224 Id. at 591. 
225 Id. at 592 (noting that “subsequent research disproved Wakefield’s findings”). 
226 Nicholas Kristof, The Dangers of Vaccine Denial, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/opinion/sunday/nicholas-kristof-the-dangers-of-vaccine-
denial.html. 
227   Christine Stuart, Connecticut Gov. Malloy immediately signs conversion therapy bill, NEW 
HAVEN REGISTER (May 10, 2017), http://www.nhregister.com/government-and-politics/ 
  20170510/connecticut-gov-malloy-immediately-signs-conversion-therapy-bill. 
228 CAL. BUS. & PROF. §§ 865–865.2 Code D. 2, Ch. 1, Art. 15 (West 20135). 
229 N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. Title 45 § § 45:1-554 (West 20134). 
230 OR. REV. STAT. § 675.850 et seq. (2015). 
231 Youth Mental Health Protection Act, 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 48/1-30Public Act 099-0411 (2016). 
232 D.C. CODE § 7-1231.14a01 et seq. (2015). 
233 See #BornPerfect: Laws & Legislation by State, NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, 
http://www.nclrights.org/bornperfect-laws-legislation-by-state/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2017). 
234 H.R. 2450, 114th Cong. (2015).  Moreover, pending resolutions H.R. Con. Res. 36, 114th Cong. 
(2015) (“Expressing the sense of Congress that conversion therapy, including efforts by mental 
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ing conversion therapy by executive action.235  During the Obama admin-
istration, the White House236—and most importantly for present purposes, 
the Surgeon General237—came out against conversion therapy.  Federal ap-
pellate courts upheld the California and New Jersey legislation, respective-
ly, but took diametrically opposed approaches in doing so.238  In addition to 
constitutional challenges under the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment, the legislation has been upheld against Free Exercise and Es-
tablishment Clause challenges.239 
From the perspective of mental health professionals, advising minors to 
subject themselves to conversion therapy has become unprofessional ad-
vice.240  In response to an Oklahoma bill to protect conversion therapy, 
 
health practitioners to change an individual’s sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender ex-
pression, is dangerous and harmful and should be prohibited from being practiced on minors.”) 
and S. Res. 184, 114th Cong. (2015) (“Expressing the sense of the Senate that conversion thera-
py, including efforts by mental health practitioners to change the sexual orientation, gender iden-
tity or gender expression of an individual, is dangerous and harmful and should be prohibited 
from being practiced on minors.”). 
235 Jesse McKinley, Cuomo Moves Against Therapy That Claims to Make Gay Children Straight, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/07/nyregion/cuomo-moves-
against-therapy-that-claims-to-make-gay-children-straight.html. 
236 Valerie Jarrett, Petition Response: On Conversion Therapy, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 8, 
2015, 8:42 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/04/08/petition-response-
conversion-therapy. 
237 Sunnivie Brydum, U.S. Surgeon General Opposes Conversion Therapy, THE ADVOCATE (Apr. 
10, 2015, 4:58 PM), http://www.advocate.com/ex-gay-therapy/2015/04/10/watch-us-surgeon-
general-opposes-conversion-therapy. 
238 Compare Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding California conver-
sion therapy law as permissible regulation of conduct), with King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 
216, 246 (3d Cir. 2014) (upholding New Jersey conversion therapy law as permissible regulation 
of speech).  Despite the circuit split on this issue, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in King v. 
Christie, 135 S. Ct. 2048 (2015). 
239 See Welch v. Brown, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1092 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (upholding California conver-
sion therapy law against Free Exercise and Establishment Clause challenges), aff’d 834 F.3d 
1041 (9th Cir. 2016). 
240 See, e.g., Brief for Am. Ass’n for Marriage & Family Therapy-N.J. Div. et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Defendants-Appellants, King v. Governor of N.J., 767 U.S. 216 , (2014) (No. 13-
4429), 2014 WL 991477, at 4 (stating that the New Jersey conversion therapy law “reflects a 
broad consensus of responsible medical and mental health experts that efforts to change a child’s 
sexual orientation may cause harm to the child, and that the use of Sexual Orientation Change 
Efforts (‘SOCE’) provides no benefits that derive from SOCE itself and that could not be 
achieved through competent professional counseling that does not attempt to change sexual ori-
entation . . . . [T]he statute is based on the current scientific understanding that homosexuality is 
not a mental disorder that can or should be ‘cured.’”).  The amicus brief concludes: 
As the medical and mental health communities have made clear for the last forty years, 
homosexuality is not a mental disorder in need of a “cure.”  The medical and mental 
health communities have advised against practices that attempt to change an individual’s 
sexual orientation because such attempts can cause long-term harm, particularly in the 
case of minors. 
  Id. at 23. 
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members of the profession articulated their opposition based on profession-
al insights.241 
In Ferguson et al. v. JONAH, Jews Offering New Alternatives for Heal-
ing (“JONAH,” f/k/a Jews Offering New Alternatives to Homosexuality), a 
New Jersey court after jury trial found conversion therapy providers to be 
engaged in consumer fraud.242  This case is particularly instructive precise-
ly for its treatment of expert testimony and the limits set to the scope of 
valid professional knowledge.  In the course of that litigation, experts 
called to testify on the benefits of conversion therapy were excluded,243 il-
lustrating how a once-accepted practice has been eliminated from the canon 
of professional knowledge—from being offered by internal outliers to be-
ing offered by external outliers.  While the pretrial ruling has no formal 
precedential effect, it did make the national news as a noteworthy devel-
opment in conversion therapy litigation.244 
Plaintiffs in the case argued that the expert testimony should be exclud-
ed because, first, “it is a scientific fact that homosexuality is not a disorder, 
but rather it is a normal variation of human sexuality, and thus any expert 
opinion concluding that homosexuality is a disorder is inadmissible.”245  
They based this assertion on the American Psychiatric Association’s 1973 
removal of homosexuality as a mental disorder from the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”), which was followed by 
professional organizations domestically and worldwide.246  Second, plain-
tiffs argued, “because the belief that homosexuality is a mental disorder is 
false and lacks any basis in science, any expert opinion that is derived from 
 
241 William S. Meyer, Duke Psychiatry Professor: Sally Kern’s Conversion Therapy Bill Would Do 
Irreparable Harm to Oklahoma Children, TULSA WORLD (Mar. 8, 2015, 12:15 AM), 
http://www.tulsaworld.com/opinion/othervoices/duke-psychiatry-profes . . . herapy-bill-
would/article_c97265a5-3cd9-508d-918b-0f81036bba59.html. 
242 Erik Eckholm, In a First, New Jersey Jury Says Group Selling Gay Cure Committed Fraud, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/nyregion/new-jersey-jury-says-
group-selling-gay-cure-committed-fraud.html. 
243  Opinion Relating to Plaintiff's Motion to Bar JONAH's Experts at 26, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. 
HUD-L-5473-12, 2015 WL 609436, at *9 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 5, 2015) (granting 
plaintiffs' motion to bar five of JONAH's experts and partially granting their motion to bar the 
sixth). 
244 See, e.g., Jason Grant, Selling Cure for Being Gay Found Illegal in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/14/nyregion/selling-cure-for-being-gay-
found-illegal-in-new-jersey.html; Olga Khazan, Can Sexuality Be Changed?, THE ATLANTIC 
(June 3, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/06/can-sexuality-be-changed/ 
  394490/; Olga Khazan, When the Therapist Is A Quack, THE ATLANTIC (June 4, 2015),  
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/06/when-your-therapist-is-a-quack/394886/; Ol-
ga Khazan, The End of Gay Conversion Therapy, THE ATLANTIC (June 26, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/06/the-end-of-gay-conversion-therapy/396953/. 
245 Opinion Relating to Plaintiff's Motion to Bar JONAH's Experts at 12, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. 
HUD-L-5473-12, 2015 WL 609436, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 5, 2015). 
246 Id. 
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that false initial premise is unreliable and should be excluded.”247  Moreo-
ver, they noted that “because their belief that homosexuality is a disorder 
conflicts with the understanding held by every legitimate professional asso-
ciation, these experts have banded together under NARTH’s umbrella.”248  
JONAH, by contrast, claimed that “reliance on the DSM is misplaced be-
cause the removal of homosexuality was a political, rather than scientific, 
decision.”249  Moreover, defendants insisted on “their experts’ clinical ex-
perience in SOCE” and the soundness of their methods.250 
In excluding the expert witnesses, the judge stated: “The overwhelming 
weight of scientific authority concludes that homosexuality is not a disor-
der or abnormal.  The universal acceptance of that scientific conclusion—
save for outliers such as JONAH—requires that any expert opinions to the 
contrary must be barred.”251  Turning to the question of reliability, since the 
litigation occurred in New Jersey state court, the Frye standard governed.252  
Applying the general acceptance standard, the court noted that “the DSM is 
unquestionably authoritative in the mental health field,” citing several in-
stances in which other courts have found so.253  With respect to the allega-
tion that the decision to remove homosexuality from the DSM was political 
rather than scientific, the court stated that “a trial court should not substi-
tute its judgment for that of the relevant scientific community.”254  None-
theless, the court did note in a footnote that “the APA does, in fact, provide 
a scientific reason for its decision to remove homosexuality as a disor-
der.”255  Whether the APA’s decision to “generally accept that homosexual-
ity is not a disorder” was correct, however, “is not a proper inquiry for a 
court.”256 
Expanding on the meaning of “general acceptance,” the court noted that 
it “is not an end in itself.  Nevertheless, general acceptance constitutes 
strong—some might say conclusive—indicia of whether a sufficient level 
 
247 Id. 
248 Id.; see also supra notes 102–105 and accompanying text (discussing the formation of NARTH 
in opposition to the American Psychiatric Association’s stance on homosexuality). 
249 Opinion Relating to Plaintiff's Motion to Bar JONAH's Experts at 15, JONAH, 2015 WL 609436, 
at *5. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. at *6. 
252 Id. at *7 (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)); id. at *9 (“The cor-
rect legal standard here is Frye’s general acceptance standard.”). 
253 Id. at *7. 
254 Id. at *8 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
255 Id. at *8 n.3. 
256 Id. at *8 (“It is not a proper inquiry for a court to determine the correctness of the APA’s deci-
sion to generally accept that homosexuality is not a disorder, and no proper basis has been ad-
vanced on which a court may reassess the scientific accuracy of the psychiatric categorization of 
homosexuality.”). 
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of reliability has been achieved.”257  Indeed, “[c]ountless organizations 
have followed the APA’s lead in removing homosexuality from its listings 
of mental disorders.”258  Although JONAH argued that a more flexible 
standard governing “a new technique or theory” should apply,259 the court 
noted that this case presented the exact opposite situation: while homosex-
uality was listed in the DSM in the past, it has been removed.260  And 
“JONAH has not identified any case that provides a standard for the admis-
sion of obsolete and discredited scientific theories.  By definition, such the-
ories are unreliable and can offer no assistance to the jury, but rather pre-
sent only confusion and prejudice.”261 
Moreover, the court addressed the question of unanimity with respect to 
the general acceptance standard, concluding that “JONAH also cannot 
point to the existence of NARTH to counter the general acceptance stand-
ard.  This argument, which assumes that general acceptance requires una-
nimity, is incorrect.”262  Thus, “general acceptance does not depend on 
unanimous or universal agreement within the scientific community.”263 
The existence of a minority of conversion therapy proponents does not and 
cannot negate the fact that the DSM and its exclusion of homosexuality are 
generally accepted in the mental health field.  Furthermore, a group of a few 
closely associated experts cannot incestuously validate one another as a means 
of establishing the reliability of their shared theories.264 
Finally, the court did take up the methodology question:  
Although not necessary to this decision, one cannot fail but notice that several 
of the JONAH experts’ reports are riddled with methodological errors that also 
render their opinions inadmissible; these include the refusal to consider studies 
that do not support their views, and the plagiarism of another JONAH expert’s 
prior work without independent research or analysis.265  
In the end, the court rightly deferred to the knowledge community’s in-
sights.  In excluding the expert witnesses, it mirrored the current state of 
the profession’s standard of good professional advice. 
 
257 Id. (citation omitted). 
258 Id. (further noting that “JONAH hardly can argue that all of these organizations—including a 
federal appellate court—were the victims of manipulation by ‘gay lobbying’ groups.  Regardless, 
it is not up to this court to decide that question.”). 
259 Id. 
260 Id. at *9. 
261 Id. 
262 Id. 
263 Id. (quoting State v. Tate, 505 A.2d 941, 950 (N.J. 1986)). 
264 Id. 
265 Id. at n.4. 
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B.  Emergent Knowledge 
The discussion of emergent knowledge that follows illustrates a shift in 
the opposite direction: using medical marijuana as an example, outliers’ 
advice can become more widely accepted in the field.  The medical mariju-
ana cases illustrate the shift from the fringe of the knowledge community 
toward the center—when the mainstream of the profession subsequently 
catches up with the “guy ahead of the curve.”  As already mentioned, as a 
matter of evidence law, the Daubert court recognized that an approach that 
privileges existing knowledge harbors the risk of stifling innovation.  Here, 
the perfect congruence of First Amendment protection and tort liability is 
challenged. 
State regulation of off-label drug use provides an example of innovative 
or generally accepted advice within the knowledge community that con-
flicts with a state-imposed regulatory scheme restricting professional ad-
vice.  The off-label drug use example illustrates how state regulation and 
professional insights collide when the state seeks to restrict professional 
advice.  Here, the need for a dynamic system of deference to the knowledge 
community becomes clear. 
1.  Medical Marijuana 
In contrast to tested and refuted knowledge, emergent knowledge by 
definition is generally untested.  The medical marijuana cases provide an 
example of how emergent and untested knowledge can gain traction within 
the knowledge community and advance to an accepted position.  One key 
question in this context is whether marijuana has medical use, and who de-
termines whether it does or does not.266  The federal government continues 
to adhere to the view “that marijuana has no currently accepted medical use 
in treatment in the United States.”267  The D.C. Circuit affirmed the gov-
ernment’s determination.268  But the medical community’s views on medi-
 
266 The Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–889 (2012), classifies drugs in five Schedules.  
Schedule I controlled substances have “no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the 
United States.” See, e.g., Conant v. McCaffrey, No. C 97-00139 WHA, 2000 WL 1281174, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2000) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)) (discussing the classification of drugs 
in the medical marijuana context). 
267 Editorial, A Sensible Bill on Medical Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2015, at A24); see also 
Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 701 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (issuing preliminary injunction lim-
iting government’s ability to prosecute physicians who recommend use of medical marijuana). 
268 See All. For Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 15 F.3d 1131, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(rejecting Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics’ claim to reclassify marijuana from Schedule I to 
Schedule II under the Controlled Substances Act). 
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cal marijuana have shifted over time.269  The First Amendment question, 
then, is whether doctors’ advice regarding the benefits of medical marijua-
na is protected professional speech, or whether the government’s determi-
nation makes it unprofessional advice. 
A California initiative, the Compassionate Use Act, took effect in 1996, 
providing a “right to obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes.”270  
The recommendation for use had to be made “by a physician who has de-
termined that the person’s health would benefit from the use of marijua-
na.”271  In the California cases, the district court and the Ninth Circuit alike 
noted that what is at stake is doctors’ ability “on an individualized basis, to 
give advice and recommendations.”272  Pursuant to federal policy, “the 
government confirmed that it would prosecute physicians, revoke their pre-
scription licenses, and deny them participation in Medicare and Medicaid 
for recommending medical marijuana.”273  With respect to the doctors’ 
First Amendment claim, plaintiffs asserted that the policy prevents them 
from “offer[ing] patients their best medical judgment regarding the use of 
marijuana to treat disease.”274  The government clarified its position, stating 
that it “does not prohibit physicians from discussing the risks and benefits 
of marijuana” and that it did not seek to “prevent physicians from com-
municating their professional judgments regarding the risks and benefits of 
any course of treatment.”275  Nonetheless, physicians are not allowed to 
“provide their patients with oral or written statements in order to enable 
them to obtain controlled substances in violation of federal law.”276 
Granting a preliminary injunction, the district court noted that “physi-
cians contend they have censored their medical advice to patients,” and 
“patients allege that as a result of the government’s policy, they no longer 
 
269 Philip M. Boffey, Editorial, What Science Says About Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/opinion/what-science-says-about-marijuana.html; Aaron 
E. Carroll, How ‘Medical’ Is Marijuana? N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
  2015/07/21/upshot/is-there-anything-actually-medical-about-medical-marijuana.html; see also 
Deepak Cyril D’Souza & Mohini Ranganathan, Editorial, Medical Marijuana: Is the Cart Before 
the Horse?, 313 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2431 (2015) (emphasizing factors that support the argument 
against the need for the use of medical marijuana). 
270     Conant, 172 F.R.D. at 685–86. 
271 Id. at 686. 
272 Id.; see also Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 644 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[I]nformation obtained from 
chat rooms and tabloids cannot make up for the loss of individualized advice from a physician 
with many years of training and experience.”). 
273 Conant, 172 F.R.D. at 686.  The federal policy was upheld in Pearson v. McCaffrey.  139 F. 
Supp. 2d 113, 125 (D.D.C. 2001). 
274 Conant, 172 F.R.D. at 686. 
275 Id. at 688. 
276 Id. 
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trust in their physicians’ advice.”277  Finding the speech to be protected by 
the First Amendment, the court concluded that the government may only 
prosecute California physicians if “it has probable cause to charge under 
the federal aiding and abetting and/or conspiracy statutes.”278  The court 
thus protected the scope of professional advice consistent with the 
knowledge community’s emergent knowledge, despite ongoing scientific 
debate.  The Ninth Circuit subsequently agreed with the district court’s as-
sessment on the First Amendment issue, noting that “[t]he government pol-
icy does . . . strike at core First Amendment interests of doctors and pa-
tients.”279 
In these cases, the characterization of medical knowledge on the bene-
fits of marijuana reveals the changing nature of the profession’s insights.  
In 1997, the district court stated that “a majority of Californians, and many 
physicians, apparently believe that medical marijuana may be a safe and 
effective treatment.”280  By the time the controversy reached the Ninth Cir-
cuit, Judge Alex Kozinski characteristically made the point very clear: 
To those unfamiliar with the issue, it may seem faddish or foolish for a doctor 
to recommend a drug that the federal government finds has “no currently ac-
cepted medical use in treatment in the United States.”  But the record in this 
case, as well as the public record, reflect a legitimate and growing division of 
informed opinion on this issue.  A surprising number of health care profession-
als and organizations have concluded that the use of marijuana may be appro-
priate for a small class of patients who do not respond well to, or do not toler-
ate, available prescription drugs.281 
Summarizing professional findings on the matter,282 he concluded that 
“there is a genuine difference of expert opinion on the subject, with signifi-
cant scientific and anecdotal evidence supporting both points of view.”283  
For patients, “obtaining candid and reliable information about a possible 
avenue of relief is of vital importance.”284  On a matter of emergent 
 
277 Id. at 690.  The opinion further notes one of the results is that “physicians . . . are unable to ad-
vise patients about safe use of marijuana or guide proper use of marijuana for treatment.”  Id. at 
691. 
278 Id. at 701; Conant v. McCaffrey, No. C 97-00139 WHA, 2000 WL 1281174, at *16 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 7, 2000) (granting in part and denying in part cross-motions for summary judgment; dis-
solving preliminary injunction; entering permanent injunction); see also Haupt, supra note 6, at 
1300–01 (discussing the question of First Amendment protection of doctors’ speech in these cas-
es). 
279 Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 636 (9th Cir. 2002) (“An integral component of the practice of 
medicine is the communication between a doctor and a patient.  Physicians must be able to speak 
frankly and openly to patients.”). 
280 Conant, 172 F.R.D. at 686. 
281 Conant, 309 F.3d at 640–41 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
282 Id. at 641–42. 
283 Id. at 643. 
284 Id. 
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knowledge, then, the First Amendment rightly protects differing opinions 
as good professional advice. 
Beyond the First Amendment context, the shift from the periphery to 
the core of professional knowledge is also reflected to a certain extent in 
the treatment of expert testimony in United States v. Oakland Cannabis 
Buyers’ Cooperative (“OCBC”)285 and Gonzales v. Raich.286  OCBC ar-
gued that “a drug may not yet have achieved general acceptance as a medi-
cal treatment but may nonetheless have medical benefits to a particular pa-
tient or class of patients.”287  Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, 
however, “decline[d] to parse the statute in this manner.”288  As Jessie Hill 
noted, “despite the fact that the patients in OCBC presented evidence, unre-
futed by the Government, that marijuana may have legitimate medical uses 
and may be the only appropriate treatment for some patients, the Court re-
fused to consider that evidence, finding itself to be powerless to override a 
conclusory and controversial congressional finding.”289 
Four years later, in Gonzales v. Raich, a Commerce Clause case, Justice 
Stevens noted that “[t]he case is made difficult by respondents’ strong ar-
guments that they will suffer irreparable harm because, despite a congres-
sional finding to the contrary, marijuana does have valid therapeutic pur-
poses.”290  Justice Thomas in dissent further pointed out that “the Medical 
Board of California has issued guidelines for physicians’ cannabis recom-
mendations, and it sanctions physicians who do not comply with the guide-
lines.”291  These cases did not hinge on the knowledge community’s profes-
sional knowledge, but they demonstrate how courts do or do not deal with 
changing professional insights when emergent knowledge is at issue. 
2.  Off-Label Use 
In order to gain approval by the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”), prescription drugs must pass rigorous clinical trials.  Upon ap-
proval of the medication, the FDA approves labeling that includes the 
chemical composition, the mechanism of action, and the regimen upon 
which approval is based.  But once the FDA has approved the drug, physi-
 
285 532 U.S. 483, 486 (2001) (holding that no implied medical necessity exception exists for the 
Controlled Substances Act). 
286 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (holding that application of the Controlled Substances Act to intrastate 
growers and users of medical marijuana does not violate the Commerce Clause). 
287 OCBC, 532 U.S. at 493. 
288 Id. 
289 B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two 
Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 294 (2007). 
290 Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 9. 
291 Id. at 62 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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cians are free to prescribe it to treat illnesses and patients beyond those in 
the trials.292  This is known as “off-label” or “evidence-based” use; as of 
2008, over one-fifth of prescriptions in the United States fell into this cate-
gory.293 
Off-label use raises numerous First Amendment questions.  In addition 
to free speech questions related to the marketing of drugs,294 there is a First 
Amendment issue directly at the heart of professional advice.  Scholars 
have noted that “if FDA were to proscribe off-label uses of drugs, it would 
interfere with physicians’ judgments about how to treat their patients, 
which is forbidden by the [Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act].”295  But doc-
tors’ freedom to prescribe drugs off-label came into direct conflict with 
state regulation to limit this ability in the abortion context.  Several states, 
including Texas,296 Ohio,297 and Oklahoma,298 passed legislation requiring 
doctors to follow FDA protocol for medication abortions.  Yet, the Okla-
homa Supreme Court noted that off-label use is “common, permissible, and 
can be required by good medical practice.”299  This type of legislation rep-
resents an instance of the legislature determining against the insights of the 
profession what should be considered good professional advice.  In effect, 
the legislature in these cases codifies previously good advice that has at-
tained internal outlier status by subsequent innovation and advances in the 
 
292 See 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2012) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit or interfere with 
the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally marketed device 
to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health care practitioner-patient rela-
tionship.”). 
293 Jacob Rogers, Freedom of Speech and the FDA’s Regulation of Off-Label Drug Uses, 76 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (2008). 
294 Generally, off-label uses may not be used for promotion of prescription drugs which raises First 
Amendment questions.  See, e.g., Christopher Robertson, When Truth Cannot Be Presumed: The 
Regulation of Drug Promotion under an Expanding First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 545, 551 
(2014); Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription and Marketing of FDA-Approved Drugs: 
An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV. 181, 199–200 (1999); Gina 
Shaw, Is Off-Label Marketing a First Amendment Right?, 9 NEUROLOGY TODAY 20, 20 (2009); 
Rodney A. Smolla, Off-Label Drug Advertising and the First Amendment, 50 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 81, 81 (2015); Dina McKenney, Note, Off-Label Drug Promotion and the Use of Disclaim-
ers, 92 TEX. L. REV. 231, 238 (2013). 
295 Robertson, supra note 294, at 548. 
296 See Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 600–05 
(5th Cir. 2014) (upholding Texas law requiring physicians to follow FDA protocol). 
297 See Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. DeWine, 696 F.3d 490, 504–06 (6th Cir. 2012) (up-
holding Ohio law requiring adherence to the FDA protocol). 
298 See Okla. Coal. for Reprod. Justice v. Cline, 292 P.3d 27, 27 (Okla. 2012) (holding Oklahoma 
statute facially unconstitutional), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2887 (2013), certified question an-
swered, 313 P.3d 253 (Okla. 2013), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 134 S. Ct. 550 
(2013). 
299 Cline v. Okla. Coal. for Reprod. Justice, 313 P.3d 253, 258 (Okla. 2013). 
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field.  Professional advice based on this emergent knowledge has become 
good advice. 
The FDA approved mifepristone (“RU-486”) in 2000.  In doing so, it 
“approved a specific regimen for administering mifepristone, but soon 
thereafter abortion providers began to change the protocol.”300  After the 
drug was approved, “additional clinical trials led to the development of 
new protocols for administering” it.301  Under the new regimen, the dosage 
of mifepristone was reduced to one-third of the original dosage.  Moreover, 
women could self-administer a second drug at home.  The length of time 
during which the drugs could be administered was extended under the new 
regimen.302  The second drug, “[m]isoprostol[,] has not been approved by 
the FDA for use in abortions but has been approved by the FDA to treat ul-
cers.”303  An alternative evidence-based regimen “involve[s] the use of 
methotrexate,” a drug whose “FDA-approved label . . . is silent on abor-
tion-related uses.”304  The Oklahoma and Ohio legislatures passed legisla-
tion requiring that doctors follow the FDA protocol.305 
In requiring doctors to prescribe drugs contrary to professional practice, 
the legislation seeks to bind doctors to the uses indicated on the label.  In 
short, the legislature determines against the knowledge community’s in-
sights what constitutes good professional advice.  Stated another way, the 
state requires doctors to dispense unprofessional advice.  In these cases, the 
courts did not consider the First Amendment implications of limiting pro-
fessional advice.  Given the newly fractured landscape among federal ap-
pellate courts regarding the proper interpretation of the First Amendment 
implications of Planned Parenthood v. Casey,306 this area of the law ap-
 
300 Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion Exceptionalism and Undue Burden Preemption, 71 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1047, 1056 (2014). 




305 The FDA changed the mifepristone guidelines in Spring 2016.  Mifeprex (mifepristone) Infor-
mation, FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationfor 
  PatientsandProviders/ucm111323.htm (last updated Mar. 30, 2016); see also Sabrina Travernise, 
New F.D.A. Guidelines Ease Access to Abortion Pill, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/31/health/abortion-pill-mifeprex-ru-486-fda.html. 
306 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  The somewhat cryptic passage in Casey dealing with the First Amendment 
states: 
All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an asserted First Amendment right of a physi-
cian not to provide information about the risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner 
mandated by the State.  To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak 
are implicated, see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), but only as part of the prac-
tice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State, cf. Whalen v. 
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977).  We see no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that 
the physician provide the information mandated by the State here. 
  Id. at 884. 
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pears to be in flux.307  The Fourth Circuit fundamentally challenged the 
Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ positions on professional speech in the abortion 
context.  Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson noted that “[t]he single paragraph in 
Casey does not assert that physicians forfeit their First Amendment rights 
in the procedures surrounding abortions . . . .”308  With respect to the rela-
tionship between the undue burden standard and the First Amendment, he 
further pointed out: “The fact that a regulation does not impose an undue 
burden on a woman under the due process clause does not answer the ques-
tion of whether it imposes an impermissible burden on the physician under 
the First Amendment.”309  In short, First Amendment protection of profes-
sional speech in the abortion context is unresolved by Casey and newly 
disputed among the circuits. 
The theory of professional speech focused on the professions as 
knowledge communities resolves the issue in favor of First Amendment 
protection of professionals’ advice from state interference.  The FDA as li-
censing body, moreover, should not determine the limits of professional 
advice.310  In fact, this is what the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act explicitly 
states: “Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit or interfere with 
the authority of a healthcare practitioner to prescribe or administer any le-
gally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease within a le-
gitimate healthcare practitioner-patient relationship.”311 
Citing this provision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted the departure 
in the abortion context from the usual deference awarded to physicians’ 
professional judgment.312  Permitting off-label use acknowledges the fact 
that professional knowledge is not static: “Researchers continue to perform 
clinical trials, doctors continue to gain experience, and widespread use of a 
particular treatment allows the medical community to collect data about 
 
307 See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 248 (4th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ 
interpretation of constitutionality of abortion regulations under the First Amendment) cert. de-
nied sub nom. Walker-McGill v. Stuart, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015); see also Scott W. Gaylord, Ca-
sey and the First Amendment: Revisiting an Old Case to Resolve a New Compelled Speech Con-
troversy, 66 S.C. L. REV. 951, 951–53 (2015) (highlighting states’ varying approaches to 
compelling doctors’ speech and uncertainty concerning the constitutionality of those approach-
es). 
308 Stuart, 774 F.3d at 249. 
309 Id. 
310 The divergence was eliminated in the 2016 updated guidelines.  Travernise, supra note 305 
(“The American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists said in a statement that it was 
‘pleased that the updated F.D.A.-approved regimen for mifepristone reflects the current available 
scientific evidence and best practices.’”). 
311 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2012). 
312 Cline v. Okla. Coal. for Reprod. Justice, 313 P.3d 253, 262 (Okla. 2013) (noting that this is “[i]n 
contrast to the deference physicians receive regarding treatment decisions in almost all other are-
as of medicine”). 
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side effects, alternative doses, and potential new uses for treatments.”313  
Leading professional organizations have endorsed the type of off-label use 
prohibited by the Oklahoma legislation.314  The court cited the FDA’s 
statement that “[g]ood medical practice and the best interests of the patient 
require that physicians use legally available drugs, biologics and devices 
according to their best knowledge and judgment.”315  This is true in all oth-
er areas of the law, and it is, in fact, “unprofessional conduct” to prescribe, 
dispense, or administer “drugs in excess of the amount considered good 
medical practice . . . .”316  In conclusion, the Oklahoma Supreme Court em-
phasized the role of the physician’s “knowledge and experience.”317  It 
agreed with the district court that the legislature’s restrictions are “com-
pletely at odds with the standard that governs the practice of medi-
cine . . . .”318  The First Amendment, consequently, should provide a shield 
against the state’s requirement that professionals dispense unprofessional 
advice.  Ultimately, the theory of professional speech and advice-giving of-
fered here supports the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s position on off-label 
drug use and rejects the opposite outcome in the decisions of the Fifth and 
Sixth Circuit. 
CONCLUSION 
The First Amendment should provide robust protection for professional 
speech.  The scope of protection has to take into account that a range of 
professional knowledge may count as good advice.  Individual profession-
als may differ in their individual judgments, but being a professional still 
implies that they subscribe to a shared body of knowledge.  And the shared 
notions of validity limit the range of professional opinions that may be 
found valid within the profession. 
To the extent that the knowledge community decides that outlier status 
is encompassed by the range of defensible professional knowledge, state 
regulation should mirror this.  Advice that is given in accordance with this 
range is good professional advice; what falls outside the scope is unprofes-
sional advice.  The client seeks good professional advice, that is, defensible 
 
313 Id. at 260. 
314 Id. at 261 (“Both the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the World Health 
Organization have endorsed these alternate regimens as safer and more effective than the now-
outdated regimen provided for in mifepristone’s FDA-approved label.”). 
315 Id. 
316 Id. (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 59 § 509(16) (2012)). 
317 Cline, 313 P.3d at 262 (“The role of the physician is to heal the sick and the injured, and physi-
cians are required to undergo rigorous training to develop the required knowledge and experience 
to perform that role well.”). 
318 Id. 
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professional knowledge.  The First Amendment should provide robust pro-
tection for this type of advice, but it does not protect unprofessional advice. 
 
	
